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I. INTRODUCTION AND RECENT EVENTS 
The mandatory detention of illegal immigrants is one of the most 
contested issues in Australia today.1 Australia’s “zero tolerance” policy 
toward illegal immigrants has raised fundamental questions regarding 
actions the government may take to ensure the sanctity of its borders. Few 
would deny the right of a sovereign power to secure its frontier.2 Debate 
rages, however, over the extent to which a sovereign country may risk 
breaching its international commitments to pursue the goal of securing its 
borders. 
In the 1990s, a majority of the Australian electorate responded to the 
increasing numbers of asylum seekers in the seas around the Australian 
continent3 by reelecting the current Liberal administration.4 Many 
Australians, however, are defying the rules promulgated by this 
administration by harboring refugees, thereby risking imprisonment.5 
Several fundamental issues are being confronted, including (a) who can be 
detained justifiably, (b) for what reasons can they be detained, (c) and for 
how long can they be detained. The government’s solution is currently to 
 1. See Adrian Tame, Refugees Split Nation, SUNDAY HERALD SUN, July 21, 2002, at 39 
(describing how the refugee controversy and management of detainees is “tearing away at something 
irreplaceable in the moral fabric of our nation,” partly because of “the total absence of any common 
ground between . . . . conflicting views”). See also Uli Schmetzer, Asylum Seekers Stage Uprising in 
Australian Camps; Government Policy Tough on Refugees, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1, 2003, at 6 (discussing 
the current tough policies in Australia vis-à-vis immigration). 
 2. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (summarizing the principles 
of sovereignty by which nation-states abide today, including a nation’s exclusive right to decide who 
can and cannot cross—and remain within—its borders). 
 3. Refugee Council of Australia, Statistics, at http://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/html/facts_ 
and_stats/stats.htm1#stat6 (last visited Apr. 3, 2005) (summarizing the number of illegal arrivals in 
Australia from 1995 to 2000). 
 4. Refugee Plight All Too True, CANBERRA TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 
4327263. 
 5. See Tame, supra note 1 (noting that Australians are “risking imprisonment for harbouring 
escapees from the detention centres”). 
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detain illegal immigrants who arrive without visas until their removal is 
“effectuated.”6 Although grounded in Parliamentary and High Court 
authority, this answer has failed to address the complex cases of stateless 
individuals and those whose removal cannot be effectuated. Moreover, the 
executive has intensified its insistence on the appropriateness and 
reasonableness of its approach of subjecting individuals to potentially 
indefinite imprisonment.7 
Recent events have suggested that the government may be forced to 
resort to more desperate measures to keep its policy afloat. In August 
2002, the Federal Court in Al-Masri v. Minister of Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs ordered the release of Akram Ouda 
Mohammad Al-Masri, a Palestinian.8 The court determined that Al-Masri 
had been illegally detained because there was “no real likelihood or 
prospect of [his] removal in the reasonable [sic] foreseeable future.”9 
Human Rights activists rejoiced;10 government executives were 
frustrated.11  
One of the Australian government’s immigration provisions struck 
down in Al-Masri included the government’s attempt to require former 
detainees to pay for the government’s costs imposed during the detainees 
mandatory detention. Following Al-Masri, former detainees began 
resisting these efforts by the government,12 though the Department of 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) stated it 
would pursue the issue further in the courts.13 This comports with 
DIMIA’s recent approach of employing whatever means necessary to 
 6. See Jim Dickins, UN Slams Children Policy, HERALD SUN, July 16, 2002, at 15. 
 7. Id. (noting how Australia’s Department of Immigration, despite explicit criticism for 
subjecting children to mandatory immigration detention, “insist[ed] it is better than alternatives such as 
releasing children into the care of their communities”). 
 8. Al-Masri v. Minister of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) F.C.A. 
1009. 
 9. Id. See Andrew McGarry, Judge Orders Release of Woomera Detainee, THE AUSTRALIAN, 
Aug. 16, 2002, at 2.  
 10. See Lauren Ahwan, Court Frees Refugee, HERALD SUN, Aug. 16, 2002, at 12 (noting that 
Jeremy Moore, from the Woomera Lawyers Group, would use the case as a precedent for other 
detainees). The decision has prompted others to question the essence of Australia’s policies and why 
they seem so cruel, at least in their implementation. See Fran Metcalf, Don’t Be Cruel, COURIER MAIL, 
Nov. 9, 2002, at L06. 
 11. See Tony Harris, Ignoring the Rule of Law, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Sept. 10, 2002, at 62 (noting 
the “annoyance” of former Immigration Minister and current Attorney General Philip Ruddock at the 
release order). 
 12. See Steve Butcher, Asylum Seeker Fights Detention Bill, NEWCASTLE HERALD, Aug. 27, 
2002, at 7 (discussing the court action initiated on August 26, 2002 by Shahid Kamran Qureshi, a 
Pakistani asylum seeker who was given a visa with the stipulation that he pay the government 
A$26,460 for his time in mandatory detention despite the fact that he is not allowed to work). 
 13. Id. 
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implement its immigration policies. In September 2001, for example, 
DIMIA spearheaded an unprecedented initiative in Parliament to “excise” 
a range of islands from Australia’s “migration zone.”14 This excision 
allowed the government to justify sending illegal arrivals—albeit avowed 
asylum seekers—to the island of Nauru, while simultaneously declaring 
Australia’s continued commitment to nonrefoulement, as enshrined in the 
Refugee Convention of 1951 and the New York Protocol of 1967.15  
In essence, because of the excision, individuals who had originally 
landed on territorial Australian islands in the Java Sea off the coast of 
Indonesia were deemed to have never officially “entered” Australia,16 the 
government thus argued that the refugees had received all the protections 
to which they were entitled under international law. This legal 
transformation of the excised islands from places of potential refuge to 
mere weigh-stations of further insecurity and degradation17 was striking in 
its ingenuity and audacity. It also supports the suspicion that DIMIA will 
continue to craft justifications for detaining refugee applicants who might 
otherwise deserve to be released. 
Detention of illegal immigrants raises additional concerns. When 
detaining individuals, for instance, Australia might take actions that are 
reminiscent of its racist past to effectuate its immigration policies.18 These 
actions could have dire consequences both for refugees seeking asylum in 
Australia and for DIMIA itself. The refugee provisions also run the risk of 
being ambiguous. Should DIMIA’s new policies generate legal confusion, 
it will be more difficult for DIMIA to achieve its goals.19 One of the most 
 14. See Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Bill 2001; Migration 
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone / Consequent Provisions) Bill 2001. (The Migration Zone 
is the area around Australia’s coastlines (as recognized by international law) and at airports (as 
recognized by statute) where individuals are allowed to effectuate entry into Australia by submitting 
themselves to Australian immigration authorities.). 
 15. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 
150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. Nonrefoulement is a more narrow remedy than asylum. The host 
country withholds removal, but does not guarantee permanent status within its borders. See STEPHEN 
H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 871–75 (3d ed. 2002). 
 16. See Migration Amendment, supra note 14 (defining “entry” to include only those places that 
are within Australia but not in the exclusion zone). 
 17. See Tame, supra note 1. 
 18. See Stuart Rintoul, Emerging from the Shadows to Face New ‘Crisis of Whiteness,’ THE 
AUSTRALIAN, May 6, 2002, at 8 (asking, “was it border protection or . . . . a deeper racism that 
underpinned the [recent] closing of Australia’s doors?”). 
 19. A primary example of a confused statute rushed hastily through Parliament is Migration 
Regulation 866.215. The regulation governs the rights of Temporary Protection Visa holders 
(“TPV”/visa subclass XA785), who are largely illegal boat arrivals from Iraq and Afghanistan, to 
apply for Permanent Protection Visas (“PPVs”/visa subclass XA866). In addition to leaving undefined 
many of the terms of the regulation, it creates a class of TPV holders who could not obtain a PPV 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss2/4
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disconcerting approaches DIMIA might attempt is to use the HIV/AIDS-
positive status of those arriving without visas to justify prolonging their 
detention. Unfortunately, this approach appears to comport with High 
Court precedent, as well as similar attempts by the United States.  
In Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs,20 the High Court upheld both the executive’s authority to use non-
punitive administrative detention to implement immigration policy and for 
multiple, non-punitive purposes. Foremost among these non-punitive 
purposes was ensuring public health. Given the absence of an Australian 
bill of rights,21 however, the High Court’s opinion leaves unanswered 
whether illegal arrivals with HIV/AIDS could be detained indefinitely on 
the basis of their health status without any right to habeas corpus 
proceedings and curial review. 
The U.S. attempt to incarcerate HIV-positive Haitians en masse in 
Guantanamo, Cuba in the early 1990s22 may fuel the inclinations of 
DIMIA officials inclined to try such an approach on a more limited basis 
in Australia. Indeed, in Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. Sale, a U.S. 
district court concluded that this form of detention was “usually reserved 
for spies and murderers,” and deprived the Haitians of due process.23 The 
court further held that the camp was the “only known refugee camp in the 
world composed entirely of HIV refugees.”24 DIMIA representatives may 
attempt, however, to distinguish DIMIA’s use of HIV/AIDS-positive 
status to prolong the detention of illegal arrivals by arguing a difference in 
degree: namely, that the detention would never approach such egregious 
merely because of logistical inconsistencies between the regulation and old law. Thus, the 
implementation of the regulation will likely result in significant litigation. See Press Release No. MPS 
47/2002, Philip Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 
Decision Time for TPV Holders, Australian Capital Territory (Jun. 11, 2002), available at 
http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media_releases/ruddock_media02/r02047.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 
2005). 
 20. Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 
176 C.L.R. 1. 
 21. See MURRAY R. WILCOX, AN AUSTRALIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS (1993) (discussing the 
benefits and costs of a bill of rights from a federal judge’s point of view); GEORGE WILLIAMS, A BILL 
OF RIGHTS FOR AUSTRALIA 35–36 (2000) (outlining the key arguments for and against a bill of rights). 
 22. See Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 23. Id. at 1045. Judge Johnson noted that the camps were surrounded by razor barbed wire, and 
the detainees tied plastic garbage bags to the sides of the building to keep the rain out. They slept on 
cots and hung sheets to create some semblance of privacy, and were guarded by the military and 
prevented from leaving the camp except under military escort. The Haitian detainees were also 
subjected to pre-dawn military sweeps by as many as 400 soldiers dressed in full riot gear. Id. at 1037. 
 24. Id. at 1045. See also George J. Annas, Detention of HIV-Positive Haitians at Guantanamo: 
Human Rights and Medical Care, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 589 (1993) (discussing the egregious lack of 
medical care facilities available for the detainees). 
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treatment as existed in Guantanamo. In essence, like the U.S. treatment of 
Haitians in Guantanamo, Australia would justify its continued detention of 
illegal arrivals as an effort to preserve public health. With HIV/AIDS-
infected individuals already subject to potentially indefinite immigration 
detention (independent of their HIV status), the idea of transubstantiating 
justifications to authorize continued non-punitive detention may appear to 
be a timely and relevant subterfuge within a seemingly straightforward, 
narrowly tailored, and facially secure statutory scheme. 
This Article argues that any attempt by DIMIA to use HIV/AIDS-status 
to justify the indefinite detention of illegal arrivals would be difficult to 
uphold. Journalists and the public alike would also likely view it 
negatively, placing it alongside the now defunct “White Australia 
Policy.”25 This analysis will show, first, that Australia’s mandatory 
immigration detention policies, which potentially allow for indefinite 
detention, have imputed time limits both generally and, in particular, with 
respect to HIV/AIDS-infected individuals. Second, while continued 
administrative detention of illegal arrivals might be justified under state 
and federal quarantine legislation, the text and context of Australia’s 
immigration and quarantine laws suggest otherwise. Third, while public 
health legislation was used during the time of the “White Australia” Policy 
to restrict significantly the number of immigrants, recent state legislation 
has created a context that should prevent the reintroduction of this 
practice. 
Part II of this Article summarizes Australia’s current mandatory 
detention laws and the risk of prolonged detention created by the absence 
of explicit time limits on detention in these laws. Part III argues that 
Australia’s current immigration laws contain implicit time limits on 
detention. It outlines statutory, consequentialist, and international legal 
arguments to demonstrate that Australia’s immigration laws would be 
unconstitutional and unlawful without time limits after which detainees 
must be released. Part IV describes why HIV/AIDS cannot be used to 
justify continued administrative detention of illegal arrivals by first 
overviewing HIV/AIDS and related laws in Australia and, second, 
highlighting key rationales supporting the continued detention of illegal 
arrivals having HIV/AIDS. The third subsection illustrates why such 
detention is unjustified by examining (a) Australian state public health and 
anti-discrimination legislation, (b) Australian commonwealth health 
concerns, (c) non-discrimination legislation enacted to comport with 
 25. See infra note 415. 
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international guidelines, and (d) Australian social mores. Part V finally 
highlights several alternatives to prolonged administrative detention that 
would enable the government to meet Australian immigration goals 
without prolonging the detention of illegal arrivals. 
II. MANDATORY IMMIGRATION DETENTION & THE INDEFINITENESS 
PROBLEM 
As in many other democratic nations, Australian has a Parliament that 
exercises its authority over immigration matters subject to the limits of a 
constitution.26 It has done so since Britain established colonies there in the 
late 1700s, often modeling its federal legislation on previously passed state 
legislation. In the 1800s, for instance, Australian states passed statutes 
limiting the numbers of Chinese people who could enter Australia.27 After 
federalization in 1901, Commonwealth legislation mirrored these state 
statutes and restricted the number of Kanaka Island28 and non-white 
laborer entrants.29 These powers were consolidated in 1949 when the High 
Court upheld the right of the Commonwealth to deport legally at any time 
anyone who had migrated to Australia based on any criteria, including 
“age, sex, race, nationality, personal character, occupation, [or] time of 
arrival.”30 Eventually, Australian immigration processes and procedures 
were codified in the Migration Act of 1958.31  
A. Law & Current Policy 
The Migration Act of 1958 continues to be the locus of Australian law 
governing the detention and removal of unlawful non-citizens. In 
particular, two sets of provisions guide immigration practices: (a) Division 
6,32 and (b) Divisions 7 and 8.33 Division 6 mandates the detention of 
 26. See AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. v, § 51 (xxvii). 
 27. See Chinese Immigrant Statute, 1855 (Vict.); Chinese Act, 1881 (Vict.); Aliens Act, 1867 
(Queensl.). 
 28. Pacific Island Labourers Act, 1901 (Austl.). 
 29. Sugar Cultivation Act, 1913 (Austl.). 
 30. Koon Wing Lau v. Calwell (1949) 80 C.L.R. 533, 561–62. This decision echoed a series of 
cases by the U.S. Supreme Court that upheld the plenary power of Congress to manage all immigration 
affairs. For a more detailed discussion of the Plenary Power Doctrine and the series of cases 
supporting it, see LEGOMSKY, supra note 15. One of the first pieces of legislation enacted by the new 
Commonwealth Government was the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, which had an infamous 
“dictation test” that became a centerpiece of the “White Australia Policy.” Immigration Restriction 
Act, 1901, § 3 (Austl.). 
 31. See Migration Act, 1958 (Austl.) [hereinafter Migration Act]. 
 32. See Migration Act, p.2, Div. 6, §§ 176–187 (Austl.). 
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“designated persons,” defined as persons arriving illegally by boat from 
late 1989 through the mid-1990s.34 Divisions 7 and 8 are comparatively 
more comprehensive. Division 7 outlines provisions mandating detention 
of all “unlawful non-citizens”35 and affects both individuals who lack valid 
visas and individuals whose visas were cancelled. Essentially, individuals 
who arrived without authority36 or overstayed the period for which they 
were authorized37 are considered to lack valid visas. Individuals may also 
have their visas cancelled for conduct before, upon,38 or after entering 
Australia.39 Division 8 then outlines the procedures and guidelines for 
removing unlawful non-citizens.40  
Division 641 outlines the detention guidelines for “designated 
persons,”42 the majority of whom are illegal boat arrivals. Although 
Division 6 may seem irrelevant given more recent amendments requiring 
the detention of all unlawful non-citizens, it is important to understand this 
division because its provisions form the foundation for the High Court’s 
holding in Lim.43 Lim held that the detention of non-citizens without 
judicial sanction is lawful as an “incident of executive power”44 and an act 
of “sovereignty over territory”45 if its purpose is to safeguard the security 
of the country.46  
The provisions of Division 6 are more detailed than those of Divisions 
7 and 8 in several ways. Because Divisions 7 and 8 were amended after 
 33. See Migration Act, p.2, Div. 7 and 8. 
 34. Migration Act, p.2, Div. 6, § 177(a). 
 35. See MARY CROCK, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW IN AUSTRALIA 178 (1998). 
 36. Migration Act, §§ 172(4), 173, 177. 
 37. Id. § 82(7). 
 38. Id. §§ 15, 97–109, 128, 140, 501. 
 39. Id. § 116. 
 40. Id. §§ 198–99. 
 41. Division 6 was numbered as Division 4B when Parliament inserted the section with the 
Migration Amendment Act of 1992. The High Court and Tribunals refer to it as Division 4B in their 
judgments. See Migration Amendment Act, 1992, n.24, § 3 (Austl.). However, the Migration 
legislation Amendment Act of 1994 renumbered the division as six. Migration Amendment Act, 1994, 
no. 60 (Austl.). 
 42. Migration Act, § 178. Section 178 of the Migration Act provides that “a designated person 
must be kept in immigration detention”, and “(2) . . . is to be released from immigration detention if, 
and only if, he or she is: removed from Australia under section 181; or granted a visa under section 65, 
351, 391, 417, or 454.” Indeed, “if subsection 181(3) applies to a designated person, the person must 
be kept in immigration detention until the person is removed from Australia under that subsection.” Id. 
Section 178 is subject to Section 182 of the Migration Act. Migration Act, § 172. 
 43. Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 
176 C.L.R. 1, 2–3.  
 44. Id. at 34. 
 45. Id. at 9. 
 46. Id. See CROCK, supra note 35, at 211 (discussing in greater detail the ramifications of the 
High Court’s holding in Lim for Australian immigration law and policy). 
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Division 6, their interpretation should reflect that of Division 6, 
particularly as to whether particular details should be accorded weight 
when making decisions with regard to time limits. 
In its initial sections, Division 6 fails to specify the amount of time 
allowed for removal of a “designated person” from Australia. It only notes 
that removal should be effectuated “as soon as practicable.”47 Later 
sections limit the amount of time “designated persons” can be held in 
detention to 273 days.48 Divisions 7 and 8 address the problem of 
managing illegal arrivals in ways similar to those of Division 6 (i.e., via 
mandatory detention); the provisions of Divisions 7 and 8, however, are 
far more comprehensive. Division 6 addressed neither the increasingly 
diverse places from which, nor the means by which, individuals were 
illegally entering Australia.49 In contrast, after reiterating the authority of 
government personnel to require all individuals to provide evidence of 
their lawful status in Australia,50 Divisions 7 and 8 state that an officer 
“must detain” individuals known or “reasonably” suspected of being 
unlawful non-citizens within Australian territory either in or outside the 
migration zone51 and excised offshore places.52 Lawful non-citizens, 
furthermore, “may” be detained if an officer “knows or reasonably 
suspects” they hold visas that may be cancelled.53 The division limits the 
length of detention to a maximum of four hours within a forty-eight hour 
 47. Migration Act, § 181 of the Migration Act states: 
(1) An officer must remove a designated person from Australia as soon as practicable if the 
designated person asks . . . . to be removed . . .  
(2) An officer must remove a designated person from Australia as soon as practicable if [one 
has been in Australia without a visa for two months or more] 
(3) An officer must remove a designated person from Australia as soon as practicable if 
[one’s visa application has been refused]. 
Id. 
 48. Id. § 182. Section 182 of the Migration Act states: 
(1) Sections 178 and 181 cease to apply to a designated person who was in Australia on 27 
April 1992 if the person has been in application immigration detention after commencement 
for a continuous period of, or periods whose sum is, 273 days. 
Id. Additional provisions in § 182(5-6) allow for an additional ninety days of authorized immigration 
detention pending an individual’s beginning court or tribunal proceedings regarding a refused entry 
application. Id. 
 49. See supra note 3. 
 50. See Migration Act, §§ 166, 167; see also NAN CROCK & BEN SAUL, FUTURE SEEKERS: 
REFUGEES AND THE LAW IN AUSTRALIA 8 (2002) (noting “[t]he federal Migration Act of 1958 and the 
Migration Regulations of 1994 establish a detailed system centered on the idea that every non-citizen 
who enters or remains in Australia must possess a visa”). 
 51. Migration Act, § 189. 
 52. Id. § 189. 
 53. Id. § 192(1). 
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period,54 implying four hours should be sufficient to determine whether a 
visa is valid. It also illustrates the lengths to which Parliament was willing 
to go to prevent illegal immigration.55 
Although Divisions 7 and 8 require detainees to be told the 
consequences of detention56 and how to apply for a visa,57 there is no 
maximum limit on the length of detention.58 Division 6 parallels Divisions 
7 and 8 in its modus operandi for removing non-citizens, providing that 
“removal” is to be conducted “as soon as reasonably practicable.”59 
Essentially, the word “reasonably” was added to the language of Division 
6 and reiterated throughout Divisions 7 and 8.60 Unlike Division 6, 
however, Divisions 7 and 8 explicitly limit the number of days a person 
can be detained.61 The only specific time limits in Division 6 are those 
allowing transitory persons in Australia (for six months) to ask the 
 54. Id. § 192(6). 
 55. See ROBERT HUGHES, THE FATAL SHORE: A HISTORY OF THE TRANSPORTATION OF 
CONVICTS TO AUSTRALIA: 1787–1968 (1986). 
 56. Migration Act, § 194. 
 57. Id. § 195. 
 58. Id. § 196. Section 196 of the Migration Act states: 
(1) An unlawful non-citizen detained under section 189 [see text referencing note 51] must be 
kept in immigration detention until he or she is: 
 (a) removed from Australia [under section 198 or 199 governing the removal of non-
citizens and their dependents]; or (b) deported under section 200; or 
granted a visa. 
(2) To avoid doubt, subsection (1) does not prevent the release from immigration detention of 
a citizen or a lawful non-citizen. 
(3) To avoid doubt, subsection (1) prevents the release, even by a court, of an unlawful non-
citizen from detention (otherwise than for removal or deportation) unless the non-citizen has 
made a valid application for a visa and he or she has been granted a visa.  
Id. 
 59. Migration Act, § 198(1A). 
 60. Id. § 198. Section 198 of the Migration Act states: 
An officer must remove as soon as reasonably practicable an unlawful non-citizen who asks 
the Minister, in writing, to be so removed. 
(1A) In the case of an unlawful non-citizen who has been brought to Australia . . . . for a 
temporary purpose, an officer must remove the person as soon as reasonably practicable after 
the person no longer needs to be in Australia . . . . An officer must remove as soon as 
reasonably practicable an unlawful non-citizen [who is covered by specific provisions in 
§ 193]. 
(2A) An officer must remove as soon as reasonably practicable an unlawful non-citizen [who 
is covered by specific provisions in § 194]. 
 . . . .  
An officer must remove as soon as reasonably practicable an unlawful non-citizen if the 
citizen [is detained and specific provisions regarding their application for a visa and 
communications with the Minister may have been made].  
Id. 
 61. Id. §§ 196, 198. 
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Refugee Review Tribunal62 to assess whether they can be considered 
legitimate refugees.63 A similar six-month time-period limits the time 
during which the Minister may determine whether a non-citizen is eligible 
for a bridging visa.64 Only those who have been “in immigration detention 
for a period of more than six months” after applying for protection visas 
are eligible for a determination under this subsection; it therefore applies 
essentially to non-citizens65 who entered Australia unlawfully66 and 
applied for protection visas afterward.  
B. The “Problem” 
The two main problems with Divisions 7 and 8 are the lack of both 
clearly defined terms and maximum time limits on detention. While 
Division 6 specified time limits, Divisions 7 and 8 merely require the 
removal of illegal arrivals from Australia “as soon as reasonably 
practicable,” without any apparent limit on the possible length of 
detention.67 Although the preliminary section of the Migration Act outlines 
and defines terms, it provides little help because it does not provide any 
standard definitions for the relevant words and phrases.68 Divisions 7 and 
8, therefore, do not give explicit guidance for interpretation of the 
“practicable” standard for removal. Rather, interpretation seems to require 
the adoption of Division 6’s similar standard.  
Because Divisions 7 and 8 were approved after the Lim decision, Lim 
likely influenced Parliament in drafting these provisions. Further, the lack 
of specificity may help prevent the legislation from appearing too rigid or 
unwieldy. It also, however, raises questions regarding the validity of 
Divisions 7 and 8 because they constrain the liberty of illegal arrivals who 
have not broken any laws. A clearer understanding of the implicit bounds 
of Divisions 7 and 8 would thus help ensure that Australia respects the 
 62. The Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) was established in 1993 to relieve the burgeoning 
caseload of refugee claims that began to amass following the arrival of boat people from Vietnam in 
the late 1980s. For more information on the RRT, its history, and its current operations, see CROCK, 
supra note 35; Website of the RRT, at http://www.rrt.gov.au (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). The RRT is 
required by law to be impartial, though critics have argued that it is far from unbiased. See Trung 
Doan, Desperate Times for Country, THE HERALD SUN, May 5, 2003, at 18. 
 63. See Migration Act, § 198C(2). 
 64. Id. § 72(2)(c). 
 65. Id. § 72(2). 
 66. Id. § 72(2)(a). 
 67. Id. § 198. 
 68. Id. § 5 (defining key terms used in the act). 
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fundamental rights of individuals and avoids breaching central social 
mores and principles. 
III. IMPLICIT TIME LIMITS TO MANDATORY IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
It is because the High Court explicitly upheld the validity of Division 6 
in the context of Australian statutory and common law that Divisions 7 
and 8 should be interpreted and validated with reference to Division 6.69 
Indeed, while it is true that Parliament omitted specific time limits from 
Divisions 7 and 8, Parliament had already drafted limits in Division 6, and 
limits were also found in the common law. This context imputes time 
limits to Divisions 7 and 8 by augmenting their lack of specificity. 
Consequentialist and international legal arguments further support the 
imputation of time limits into Divisions 7 and 8. The following three 
subsections address each argument in turn. 
A. Contextual Statutory & Common Law Arguments 
The statutory context of Divisions 7 and 8 provides the basis for the 
first argument: namely, that these provisions contain implicit time limits 
by deducing the most logical meanings that should be ascribed to the 
provisions. This is demonstrated by: (a) examining how the old provisions 
operated; (b) identifying how the new provisions could operate; (c) 
confirming how the new provisions are fundamentally similar to the old 
provisions (in that the new provisions largely apply to the same groups of 
people covered by the old provisions); and (d) concluding that the only 
apparent difference in the new provisions—namely, the use of the word 
“practicably” in connoting when detention must end—comports with the 
interpretation that time limits in the old provisions should be inferred in 
the new provisions. The upshot is that individuals currently subject to 
mandatory immigration detention cannot be detained indefinitely. 
First, as mentioned earlier, the provisions of the Migration Act 
reviewed in Lim equate the principle of removal “as soon as practicable”70 
with a time limit of 273 days.71 When considered along with accepted 
constitutional and legal constraints on the state’s ability to infringe on an 
individual’s liberty, it seems likely that Parliament was concerned that the 
 69. See Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs 
(1992) 176 C.L.R. 1, at 52. 
 70. Migration Act, § 181. 
 71. Id. § 182. This time limit is explicitly extendable by ninety days if certain criteria are met. Id. 
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term “as soon as practicable”72 needed further clarification. This 
combination also illustrates that Parliament did not intend to place a 
maximum limit on the length of detention when removal is not practicable. 
Indeed, Parliament delineated criteria to determine which days constitute 
part of the time limit.73 These provisions expressly exclude days when 
events beyond “the control” of DIMIA occurred.74 Thus, the time during 
which the Australian government is essentially powerless does not fall 
under the “practicability” aegis. In Division 6, detention of “suspected 
offenders” includes both (a) the time during which prosecution of the 
ostensible offences occurs, and (b) all the time required by the legal 
proceedings.75 Additionally, other parts of Division 6, detailing the scope 
of detention of “suspected offenders,” parallel Divisions 7 and 8.76  
The High Court’s decision in Minister for Immigration & Ethnic 
Affairs v. Tang Jia Xin (the Bolkus case)77 illustrates both the significance 
of Division 6’s guidelines and the connection between the “practicable” 
standard and the express detention time limit. Relying on the statutory 
context of Division 6, the High Court in Bolkus held that the statutory time 
limit included the time during which DIMIA worked to secure a detainee’s 
release.78 The Court, however, rejected arguments that the time following 
a legitimate request for information is included in the limits.79 For 
example, the time during which DIMIA attempted to address matters 
outside its control was not included. The High Court specifically focused 
on how the time limits in Division 6 should be applied when an individual 
had been detained for over a year,80 concluding that the 273-day time limit 
included the time during which DIMIA had made several inquiries into the 
matter because DIMIA had not clearly demonstrated that it had an 
“inability to obtain information . . . . by a person who was not under its 
control.”81 The practicability standard thus required the detainee’s release.  
 72. Id. § 250 (addressing the specific reasons why non-citizens detained as a “suspected 
offenders” of certain laws should be kept in immigration detention). 
 73. Id. § 182(3)(c)–(f). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. § 250(3)(1); see also Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government and 
Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 C.L.R. 1 (noting how these provisions are entirely consistent with the power 
of a sovereign state, such as Australia, to ensure firm control over those whom it admits or deports). 
 76. Id. § 250(4). 
 77. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Tang Jia Xin (1994) 69 A.L.J.R. 8. The case 
will hereinafter be referred to as the Bolkus case, after Senator Nick Bolkus, who was at the time 
serving as Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs. 
 78. See id. ¶ 15. 
 79. Id. ¶ 8. 
 80. Migration Act, § 182. 
 81. Bolkus, 69 A.L.J.R. ¶ 15. 
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The court explained that the provisions of Division 6 “all imply . . . . 
something which has happened to interrupt the decision-making by the 
Department in regard to the application . . . .”82 Furthermore, the court 
held that not only was DIMIA’s “legitimate request for information . . . . 
awaited, but also that the continued departmental dealing with the 
application was, on that account, interrupted.”83 The court implied that if 
DIMIA had finalized a decision—and did not require any additional, 
explicit information to continue its decision making process—the time that 
subsequently passed should count toward the limit of clear 
“practicability.”84 
Like Division 6, the new provisions of Divisions 7 and 8 address issues 
of detention and removal, but provide no express time limits with regard to 
detention. Again, on their surface, the sovereign power of the state to 
control who enters its borders appears to be the means of justifying such 
provisions. Moreover, the High Court has upheld the foundational 
principles of prima facie non-punitive administrative detention that 
underlie immigration detention.85 It is telling, however, that the removal 
stipulations in Divisions 7 and 8 expressly direct that detention must 
continue until one is (a) removed, (b) deported, or (c) granted a visa,86 
employing language that parallels Division 6. This does not mean that the 
deleted provisions of Division 6 should be definitively read back into the 
new provisions of Divisions 7 and 8. It does, however, demand an analysis 
of whether their similarity to the old provisions means that elements of the 
old provisions should be embraced, thereafter suggesting how the new 
provisions could then operate. 
Central to determining whether time limits inure in the new provisions 
is determining whether the words “as soon as reasonably practicable” in 
the new provisions87 mean the same thing as the words “as soon as 
practicable” in the old provisions88 and, if so, why. Two alternatives exist. 
First, the addition of the word “reasonably” could reflect the difference 
between the removal addressed in the different divisions;89 or second, the 
removal in each division is fundamentally similar in character, and the 
 82. Id. ¶ 9. 
 83. Id. ¶ 10. 
 84. The implications of these holdings for those whose applications to stay in Australia have 
been finalized is discussed in greater detail below. 
 85. See Koon Wing Lau v. Calwell (1949) 80 C.L.R. 533 (holding that the executive has the 
administrative authority to detain aliens). 
 86. See Migration Act, § 196. 
 87. Id. § 198. 
 88. Id. § 181. 
 89. Id. §§ 181, 198. 
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additional word “reasonably” implies that Divisions 7 and 8 include 
temporal maxima similar to those explicitly iterated in Division 6.90 In the 
former case, one must assess the import of the word “reasonably” and how 
best to interpret it in light of the differences between the divisions; in the 
latter case, one can reasonably argue that the similarities between the 
divisions indicate that the guidelines of Division 691 should apply to 
individuals under Divisions 7 and 8 as well. In either case, the Migration 
Act’s language and context imply that time limits exist and that lengthy 
detention is unlawful. 
Division 6 and Divisions 7 and 8 largely affect the same people—
namely, illegal boat arrivals.92 Division 6 mandates the detention of 
“designated persons,” defined as boat people93 who had not received valid 
visas upon entering Australia.94 Divisions 7 and 8 appear to expand this 
group to include both “unlawful non-citizens” and people who are 
“reasonably suspected” of seeking to take actions that would make them 
“unlawful non-citizens” (i.e., by entering the migration zone).95 Because 
Divisions 7 and 8 define “unlawful non-citizens”96 as anyone in the 
migration zone who does not hold a valid visa, or who is an “illegal 
entrant,”97 the term ‘unlawful non-citizens’98 includes anyone (a) in the 
migration zone, (b) in an excised offshore place, (c) in Australia and 
reasonably suspected of seeking to enter the migration zone, or (d) in 
Australia and reasonably suspected of seeking to enter an excised offshore 
place.99 Because it corresponds to the same people as categories (a) and 
(b), the term “designated persons” in Division 6 forms a subset of the 
 90. Id. § 182. 
 91. Id. § 181. 
 92. See supra notes 32 and 33 and accompanying text. See also CROCK & SAUL, supra note 50, 
at 29–51 (discussing that although the actual percentage of illegal boat arrivals is low, social 
perception of the problem is high, and Parliament has reacted by passing stringent immigration laws).  
 Having used such a system to detain illegal immigrants and, in particular, HIV-positive asylum-
seekers, the United States provides significant guidance with regard to administrative detention 
systems. See Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). The Sale court 
found that the due process rights of HIV-positive asylum-seekers detained at Guantanamo Bay had 
been denied when their detention no longer served a legitimate purpose. It further explained that 
“[c]ontinued detention” “constitutes a denial of due process where there is no guarantee” that detention 
will end after all remedies have been exhausted. Id. at 1045, citing United States v. Gonzalez-Claudio, 
806 F.2d 334, 341 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 93. See Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs 
(1992) 176 C.L.R. 1, 23. 
 94. Migration Act, § 177 (defining the term “designated person” with five key criteria). 
 95. Id. §§ 189 and 198. 
 96. Id. §§ 13–14. 
 97. See id. § 14(2) (applying this term to those who arrived after Sept. 1, 1994). 
 98. See id. § 198. 
 99. Id. § 189 (iterating the four situations in which unlawful non-citizens must be detained). 
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“unlawful non-citizens” referenced in Divisions 7 and 8.100 Thus, whether 
Division 6 and Divisions 7 and 8 are expressly different in character 
depends on whether the individuals included in categories (c) and (d) 
differ significantly from the overlapping subsets of (a) and (b).  
In fact, the seemingly new subsets of individuals included in (c) and (d) 
arise from a legal slight of hand. The only question is whether one has 
entered the migration zone or an excised off-shore place without a visa, or 
is “reasonably suspected”101 of seeking to enter the migration zone or an 
excised off-shore place, without a visa. While those in the latter subset 
could be viewed as more culpable, individuals in both categories desire to 
be on the Australian mainland. The only difference is whether they were in 
places where their lawfulness could be practically determined. 
Accordingly, it would be illogical for a time limit to apply to individuals 
in categories (a) and (b), but not to individuals in categories (c) and (d) of 
Divisions 7 and 8. 
If, therefore, the removal provisions in Division 6 and Divisions 7 and 
8 apply to fundamentally similar individuals, the word “reasonably” 
should capture this similarity to a certain extent. Although not required, 
courts often apply conventional definitions to legal “terms of art.” 
Australian courts typically reference the Merriam-Webster Dictionary of 
Standard English, which defines “reasonable” as “being in accordance 
with reason; . . . . not extreme or excessive; . . . . moderate,” and “fair.”102 
Thus, the term “reasonable” captures the essence of moderation, fairness, 
and rationality.  
Although the meanings of legal terms can differ from statute to statute, 
these conceptions of the word “reasonably” exist in both Australian civil 
and criminal common law. In civil law, the “reasonable man” standard is 
the foremost foundation for determining tort liability,103 and the High 
Court has found the concept of “reasonableness” to include both 
subjective and objective components.104 In criminal law, the 
 100. See Lim, 176 C.L.R. at 64–65 (stating that “notwithstanding the vesting of discretion in the 
Department to determine who should be a ‘designated person,’ only a ‘non-citizen’ . . . . can become a 
designated person . . . . The effect of a Departmental designation is to confine the operation of Div. 4B 
to some only [sic] of the non-citizens who are in Australia”).  
 101. See Migration Act, § 189(2), (4). 
 102. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY OF STANDARD ENGLISH 974 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 
10th ed. 1999). 
 103. See, e.g., Hackshaw v. Shaw (1984) 155 C.L.R. 614, 651. “[Negligence does not] prescribe a 
special standard of care. The duty is a duty to take reasonable care. The standard is the standard of the 
reasonable man.” Id. Accord Cook v. Cook (1986) 162 C.L.R. 376. 
 104. R. v. Kirstain William Katarzynski (2002) N.S.W.S.C. 613 (stating that courts currently 
apply a mixed objective and subjective standard). 
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“reasonableness” concept has primarily been used to justify a defendant’s 
actions.105 
The High Court further elucidated the concept of reasonableness in the 
context of defenses to otherwise unlawful acts in Taikato v. The Queen.106 
The court noted that the “chief difficulty” in “interpreting ‘reasonable 
excuse’” was finding “a principled way of distinguishing cases in which 
the legislature could not conceivably have envisaged such a defense 
arising and those where it may well have envisaged such a defense being 
available.”107 Thus, interpretation was much easier if the legislature 
established clear guideposts by statute. Justice Dawson stated, “a 
reasonable excuse is no more or less than an excuse which would be 
accepted by a reasonable person,”108 bridging the gap between criminal 
and civil law by highlighting the similarity between the two.  
In summary, modifying the word “practicable” with the term 
“reasonably,” as used in Divisions 7 and 8, clarifies when removal must be 
effectuated and suggests that what is “practicable” must be determined by 
standards that make sense, are prudent, and comport with societal mores. 
The time limits in Division 6 partially addressed these qualitative 
requirements, indicating that removal would be “impracticable” if a certain 
amount of time passed during which removal could not be effectuated.109 
Furthermore, the use of the word “reasonably” suggests that all guidelines 
to interpreting the term “practicable” should apply to Divisions 7 and 8 
because Divisions 7 and 8 apply to essentially the same people as Division 
6. Indeed, following Bolkus, these guidelines must include Division 6’s 
time limits. The High Court’s decision in Bolkus is, ultimately, the 
paramount example of why imputation of the time limits of Division 6 into 
Divisions 7 and 8 comports with the broader concept of 
“reasonableness.”110 
 105. Justice Cave noted in The Queen v. Tolson: “At common law an honest and reasonable belief 
in the existence of circumstances which, if true, would make the act for which a prisoner is indicted an 
innocent act has always been held to be a good defence.” The Queen v. Tolson (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 168 
(quoting the High Court in He Kaw Teh v. the Queen (1985) 157 C.L.R. 523). 
 106. Taikato v. The Queen (1996) 186 C.L.R. 454 (attempting to elucidate a clear standard that 
could be applied in determining whether a particular excuse was “reasonable”). 
 107. Id. at 465. 
 108. See id. at 470 (defining a “reasonable excuse”). 
 109. See Migration Act, §§ 181, 182; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699–700 (2001) 
(finding indefinite detention illegal and noting that the government should measure “reasonableness 
primarily in terms of the . . . basic purpose [of the statute authorizing detention], namely assuring the 
alien’s presence at the moment of removal. Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court 
should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized . . .”). 
 110. See generally Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Tang Jia Xin (1994) 69 A.L.J.R. 
8. 
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B. Consequentialist Arguments: Two Lines of Analysis 
In addition to these contextual statutory arguments, two lines of 
consequentialist arguments also may be employed to impute time limits 
into the provisions of Divisions 7 and 8. Both arguments focus on the 
necessity of time limits to avoid shifting the character of the detention 
from “administrative” to “penal.” The first argument is based on the High 
Court’s decision in Lim, which upheld the legitimacy of mandatory 
immigration detention because it was clearly and explicitly limited: (a) by 
its purpose, (b) by the ability of the detainees to end their detention at any 
time, and (c) by the existence of maximum time limits.111 Specifically, the 
High Court held that in the absence of time limits, “penal shifts” inevitably 
occur because lengthy detention would exceed what is absolutely 
necessary for deportation purposes.112 The Lim court found the absence of 
time limits problematic for two reasons: first, because penal detention 
requires curial review (i.e., the penal detention must be reviewed by the 
judicial branch); and second, because this curial review necessarily divests 
the executive of authority.113  
The second line of argument expands on the court’s rationale in Lim. If 
one focuses on the possibility that detention might advance an 
administrative end other than the deportation of illegal aliens, only 
administrative shifts can justify administrative detention after long periods 
of time. In essence, this argument asserts that time limits help ensure that 
any shifts in the character of detention are clear and explicit. Because such 
open, clear shifts are more easily challenged, this argument contends that 
time limits reduce the likelihood that detention will become penal and that 
significant injustices will occur. 
1. Lim—Based Argument: Administrative Immigration Detention Is 
Only Valid When It Is Clearly Limited 
Long before the promulgation of both Division 6 and Divisions 7 and 
8, the High Court upheld the executive’s use of administrative detention in 
limited circumstances. First, in Koon Wing Lau v. Calwell,114 the High 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Wartime Refugees Removal 
 111. Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Immigration Local Government and Ethic Affairs (1992) 176 
C.L.R. 1. 
 112. Lim, 176 C.L.R. at 26–29. 
 113. Lim, 176 C.L.R. at 27. 
 114. Koon Wing Lau v. Calwell (1949) 80 C.L.R. 533. 
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Act’s115 broad grant of deportation and detention authority to the Minister 
of Immigration. The act allowed the Minister to deport individuals who 
had entered Australia during World War II without being domiciled 
there.116 It also permitted the Minister to hold these individuals in custody 
“in order to ensure” deportation occurred,117 explaining that the Australian 
constitution gave Parliament these plenary powers.118 
More recently, the Lim decision expressly held that the Australian 
Parliament can give the executive authority to subject aliens to mandatory 
detention within certain bounds.119 The court found that detention of non-
citizens did not necessarily involve “an exercise of the judicial power that 
should have been reserved to the courts.”120 Furthermore, where the need 
to safeguard the country’s security demanded detention, such action was 
constitutionally121 sufficient to prevent that review.122 The court further 
noted that the case involved purely civil matters, and the ability of 
detainees to leave Australia at any time prevented the detention from being 
a form of punishment.123 The court upheld its own power to order the 
removal of individuals from detention if it found the detention illegal.124 In 
upholding its own curial review, the court invalidated a provision denying 
the “court [authority] to order the release from custody of a designated 
person,”125 a provision that failed judicial scrutiny because it was 
exceedingly broad.126 It also did not account for circumstances when 
Chapter III of the Australian constitution required that unlawful custody 
be subject to curial review.127 Nevertheless, even the minority of justices 
who considered the provision constitutional upheld the validity of the 
mandatory detention because it was clearly bounded.128  
In the court’s view, the combination of (a) the purpose of detention, (b) 
individuals’ ability to end their detention at any time, and (c) the existence 
 115. Wartime Refugees Removal Act, 1949 (Austl.). 
 116. See Koon, 80 C.L.R. at 550. See also CROCK, supra note 35, at 19–22. 
 117. Koon, 80 C.L.R. at 550–51. See also Lim, 176 C.L.R. at 47 (summarizing the key holdings of 
Koon). 
 118. Lim, 176 C.L.R. at 30–31. 
 119. Id. at 32. 
 120. CROCK, supra note 35, at 211. 
 121. See AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, § 51 (xix). 
 122. Lim, 176 C.L.R. at 114–15. 
 123. Id. at 33–34. 
 124. Id. at 2–3; see also CROCK, supra note 35, at 210–11. 
 125. The court invalidated § 54R. The Migration Legislation Amendment Act of 1994 renumbered 
and replaced the provision with § 183. See Migration Legislation Amendment Act, 1994 (Austl.). 
 126. Lim, 176 C.L.R. at 38. 
 127. Id. at 2. 
 128. Id. at 1. 
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of maximum time limits all limited the Minister’s authority. The first limit 
central to the court’s decision to uphold the mandatory detention provision 
was the purpose of the detention. Because aliens are not outlaws, 
regardless of “whether [they are] lawfully or unlawfully” in Australia, the 
executive could not infringe their liberty without a legislative mandate.129 
The High Court further noted that because the provisions dealt with the 
admission and deportation of non-citizens from Australia, the legislature 
could delegate authority to the executive branch.130 The High Court 
explicitly noted that “the context and . . . . the purposes of executive 
powers to receive, investigate and determine [whether to] . . . admit or 
deport” aliens limited the Minister’s authority, thereby keeping this grant 
of authority within the bounds of constitutionality.131 The issue before the 
court centered on illegal detention,132 and these purposes were independent 
of the fact that adjudicating and punishing criminal guilt under a law of the 
commonwealth were essentially and exclusively judicial in character.133 
The provision, therefore, complied with Chapter III of the Australian 
constitution.134  
The second limit underlying Lim was the ability of detainees to end 
their detention by requesting to leave Australia, an action that could be 
undertaken at any time. This ability to end one’s own detention solely 
based on one’s own actions led the court to conclude that the detention 
was not punitive.135 It should be noted, however, that several justices 
highlighted that time limits alone would have been insufficient without 
this provision.136  
This leads to the final factor upon which the court relied: the existence 
of time limits. The court explained that the legislative provisions under 
review were never meant to apply indefinitely—or even for excessively 
 129. Id. at 19. 
 130. See id. at 25 (noting that aliens fall under the scope of the legislature’s power to manage 
aliens under § 51(xix) of the constitution). 
 131. Id. at 32. 
 132. Id. at 35–26 (listing examples of situations in which illegal detention could occur). 
 133. Id. at 27. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 72. Section 198(a) of the Migration Act requires the Minister to remove individuals 
who request it in writing “as soon as reasonably practicable.” Migration Act, § 192(1). The Lim court 
noted that “even if the provisions . . . . could be characterized as a punishment . . . . a designated 
person may release himself or herself from the custody imposed or enforced . . .” Id. at 72. Because 
this is still possible under Divisions 7 and 8, some argue that all immigration detention is still non-
penal regardless of whether there are time limits. See Migration Act, § 198. However, even if 
individuals want and request to leave, they often cannot do so; thus, they could remain indefinitely in 
detention. 
 136. Lim, 176 C.L.R. at 33. 
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long periods of time. Rather, the provisions were “intended to have a 
strictly temporary operation.”137 They only authorized a transitory “period 
of custody . . . pending the departure” of the ship on which the detainee 
had arrived.138 Indeed, the court noted that: 
the time limitations imposed by other provisions [in addition to 
those requiring the removal from detention of individuals who 
request it] suffice, in our view, to preclude a conclusion that the 
powers of detention which are conferred upon the Executive exceed 
what is reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for the 
purposes of deportation or for the making and consideration of an 
entry application.139 
Because these time limits prevented indefinite detention, which was 
implicitly assumed to “exceed what is reasonably capable of being seen as 
necessary for . . . . deportation,”140 the provisions were not held to be 
punitive in nature and, therefore, were not found to be subject to Chapter 
III of the constitution.141 
Justice McHugh reinforced this conclusion by writing, with regard to 
the nine-month maximum (i.e., 273 days),142 that 
[i]nordinately long as the potential period of detention [of nine 
months] may seem to be, it has to be evaluated in . . . . context . . . . 
The appropriateness of the period of detention for the individual 
cannot be isolated from the administrative burden cast on the 
Department in investigating and determining the vast number of 
applications . . . .”143 
Justice McHugh, while indicating that he actually found the nine-month 
limit “inordinately long,” thus suggested that it would be very difficult to 
find an “administrative burden” capable of justifying a breach of this limit. 
Justice Mason further echoed these sentiments in observing that while “a 
failure to remove a designated person from Australia ‘as soon as 
practicable’ . . . . would . . . . deprive the Executive of legal authority to 
retain that person in custody,”144 the Executive’s power was secure given 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Migration Act, § 182. 
 143. Id. at 41. 
 144. Id. at 12. 
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the time limits in place. Indeed, he pointed out that because “Parliament 
did specifically provide for . . . . circumstances in which lawful custody 
would terminate,”145 it could also justifiably prevent the courts from 
terminating the detention. Among these “circumstances” were clear time 
limits to detention, after which the detention had to cease.146 
This first line of argument imputes time limits into the new provisions 
of the Migration Act by relying on the High Court’s Lim analysis. The Lim 
court upheld the authorization in Division 6 of the detention of unlawful 
non-citizens because it was limited by: (a) the purpose of the detention; (b) 
the ability of individuals to end their detention at any time; and, most 
importantly for these purposes, (c) the existence of maximum time 
limits.147 Notably, the Lim decision reiterates the High Court’s authority 
under Chapter III of the constitution to review writs of habeas corpus 
where detention is non-administrative and punitive in nature. 
2. Argument Transcending Lim: “Administrative Shifts” Cannot Be 
Made Without Explicit Time Limits 
Examining the purpose of immigration detention both enables one to 
see how its character can change, and provides a framework for 
recognizing the importance of avoiding “penal” shifts by means of 
imputing time limits on administrative detention. Under Divisions 7 and 
8,148 DIMIA may detain all illegal arrivals until they are removed, 
deported, or granted a visa.149 This grant implies that the purpose of 
detention is to supervise individuals until they either leave Australia or get 
a visa authorizing their continued stay.150 If, however, there is no 
reasonable prospect of the individual’s release, then the purpose of the 
detention is not for immigration reasons,151 thus fundamentally changing 
the character of the detention.152 Furthermore, because the “involuntary 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 11. 
 147. See id. at 1. 
 148. Migration Act, § 196. 
 149. Id. § 196(1)(a)–(c) (outlining the specifics of these three possibilities). 
 150. See Lim, 176 C.L.R. at 71. Justice McHugh noted: 
[I]mprisonment of a person who is the subject of a deportation order is not ordinarily punitive 
in nature because the purpose of the imprisonment is to ensure that the deportee is excluded 
from the community pending his or her removal from the country . . . . But if imprisonment 
goes beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the non-punitive object, it will be 
regarded as punitive in character. 
Id. 
 151. See id. at 12. 
 152. Id. at 71. 
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detention of a citizen in custody by the State is penal or punitive in 
character and . . . . exists only as an incident of the exclusively judicial 
function of adjudging and punishing criminal guilt,”153 it is essential that 
the character of detention be identified clearly and precisely. This is true 
especially in cases where that character changes. Indeed, it is likely that 
Parliament was aware that such a change can occur. First, Parliament 
expressed this notion when it set forth the explicit time limits of Division 
6, and incorporated time limits implicitly in Divisions 7 and 8. Second, 
Parliament created the “reasonably practicable” guideline in Divisions 7 
and 8, which suggested that a line be drawn after which the nature of the 
detention fundamentally changes.  
The Lim court seems to have been cognizant of this shift when it wrote 
that such a “character change” to detention was evidenced in the law. 
Judge McHugh noted that “a law authorizing the detention of an alien . . . . 
beyond what was reasonably necessary to effect the deportation of that 
person, . . . . might be invalid because it infringed the provisions of Ch. III 
of the Constitution.”154 Detention that continued, for example, even after 
all “reasonably practicable” actions had been taken to end it would go 
“beyond what was necessary.”155 Furthermore, because the 
“reasonableness” of an action is determined on a case-by-case basis, courts 
are the most effective venue for the adjudication of reasonableness.156  
The character of detention can change in two ways. Detention can 
undergo an administrative shift, in which it remains administratively non-
punitive in nature; thus, only the administrative purpose of the detention 
changes. Alternatively, detention can become punitive in nature—and 
therefore no longer administratively mandated—through a penal shift. In 
the case of the former, Parliament must explicitly authorize the detention 
either directly or through the executive; in the case of the latter, Chapter 
III of the constitution is invoked and the detention is reviewable by the 
courts.157  
 153. Id. at 27 (discussing the implications of Chapter III of the Australian constitution with regard 
to the judiciary reviewing the lawfulness of detention). 
 154. Id. at 65. 
 155. See Al Masri v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 
192 A.L.R. 609 (ordering the release of a Palestinian detainee due to the fact that all reasonably 
practicable means had been exhausted). 
 156. Based on these comments it appears that the existence or likelihood of excessive periods of 
time passing while an individual is detained could be used as a sui generis test to determine whether 
detention has changed in character. 
 157. See Lim, 176 C.L.R. at 27 (noting that among the functions that are “exclusively judicial in 
character,” is the “adjudgment and punishment of criminal guilt under a law of the Commonwealth”). 
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To identify “administrative shifts” simply requires an awareness of the 
situations that permit administrative, non-punitive detention. These 
situations typically involve issues of public health or national security.158 
One can envisage a scenario in which immigrants in detention could 
become seriously ill or harbor a disease that could be passed on to others. 
In these cases, lengthy detention could be justified under an 
“administrative shift” by Parliamentary acts, which take effect when the 
alternative “non-punitive” public health “objectives” are brought forth. 
The continued detention of individuals who do not fall within these 
“exceptional cases,” on the other hand, must be scrutinized closely to 
determine whether the detention has shifted from non-punitive to 
punitive.159 
Penal shifts can occur in three typical situations, including when: (a) 
the legal prerequisites cannot reasonably be established that allow for the 
achievement of non-punitive ends; (b) a lengthy period of time has passed 
that precludes achievement of a non-punitive object; or (c) the non-
punitive goals are explicitly or impliedly rescinded in favor of punitive 
goals.160 
The first form of penal shift occurs when the non-punitive goals of 
detention become legally impossible to achieve. For example, the Lim 
court upheld executive detention authority because it advanced the non-
punitive detention purposes of expulsion and deportation.161 When 
detention can no longer reasonably be viewed as serving these purposes, 
there has been a penal shift.162 Although rare, this form of penal shift can 
occur in Australia, for instance, when: (a) Australia lacks a repatriation 
agreement with a detainee’s home country, and there is no reasonable 
prospect of such an agreement being wrought (e.g., Iraq); (b) the detainee 
is stateless, and, therefore, there is nowhere to which the detainee can be 
returned (e.g., Hazara Kurds); and (c) the detainee’s citizenship does not 
allow her a right of return (e.g., Palestinians from the Gaza Strip).163 In 
 158. Id. at 55 (noting that a person “may lawfully be held in custody” pursuant to mental health 
legislation and on remand pending trial); see also Kable v. The Director of Public Prosecutions for the 
State of New South Wales (1996) 189 C.L.R. 57, 86 (explaining that “[i]nvoluntary detention in cases 
of mental illness or infectious disease can also legitimately be seen as non-punitive in character). 
 159. See Lim, 176 C.L.R. at 27 (noting that “putting to one side the exceptional cases . . . . the 
involuntary detention of a citizen in custody by the State is penal or punitive in character and, under 
our system of government, exists only as an incident of the exclusively judicial function of adjudging 
and punishing criminal guilt.”). 
 160. See generally id. at 26–29. 
 161. Id. at 30–31. 
 162. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001). 
 163. See Al Masri, 192 A.L.R. ¶¶ 43–65. 
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these situations, the detainee cannot be removed from immigration 
detention because removal is predicated upon international legal 
prerequisites that cannot be satisfied, or there is nowhere to which the 
detainee can practicably be removed. When the ends of non-punitive 
administrative detention become unachievable, continued detention must 
become unlawful.164 Notwithstanding additional laws authorizing 
continued administrative detention, the detainee either must be released or 
the continued detention must be subjected to curial review.165  
Second, non-punitive detention can become punitive after a lengthy 
period of time. The imposition of time limits in Division 6166 illustrates 
Parliament’s perception that lengthy periods of detention are, by that very 
lengthiness, punitive. These time limits also show that the use of the term 
“reasonably practicable” indicates that administrative authorities cannot 
achieve the desired administrative ends. Indeed, the Lim court reflected 
this conclusion, holding that excessively long detention could be construed 
as confirming the inability of the administrative proceedings to be 
conducted in a “reasonably practicable” manner167 and, consequently, that 
further detention required curial review.168 In this respect, it stands to 
reason that even though Divisions 7 and 8 do not include specific 
maximum time limits, the period of detention is neither unbounded nor 
indefinite. At the very least, the time limits in Division 6 constitute a 
guideline to be applied in determining whether non-punitive detention has 
become punitive. 
Courts in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Hong Kong have 
upheld the idea that lengthy detentions are punitive, and Australian judges 
have often sought guidance from these courts. In Zadvydas v. Davis, for 
example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the indefinite detention of U.S. 
resident aliens from Cambodia and Lithuania (when their home countries 
refused to readmit them) violated the 5th Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.169 The 5th Amendment’s procedural due process guarantees 
protect “all persons” in the United States, whether they are here lawfully 
or unlawfully, temporarily or permanently.170 In essence, the U.S. 
 164. See Lim, 176 C.L.R. at 51. 
 165. Al Masri, 192 A.L.R. ¶¶ 16–18. 
 166. Migration Act, § 182. 
 167. Lim, 176 C.L.R. at 21. 
 168. Id. at 31. 
 169. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. See Sev Ozdowski, US Supreme Court Decisions Challenge 
Australian Assumptions, CANBERRA TIMES, Aug. 2, 2001, available at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/ 
media_releases/op_ed/us_supreme_court.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). 
 170. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. 
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Supreme Court held that this protection only existed for immigration 
detainees if there was (a) an implicit reasonableness limitation, and (b) a 
presumptive limit of six months on the reasonable duration of post-
removal immigration detention. After six months, the government faces 
the burden of rebutting a presumption that “there is no significant 
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”171 The Court 
noted that the issue presented a choice “between imprisonment and 
supervision under release conditions that may not be violated.”172 
Moreover, it acknowledged that the statute applied “not only to terrorists 
and criminals, but also to ordinary visa violators,” whose only burden was 
showing the unreasonableness of their detention.173 The Court, therefore, 
assumed that detainees should not be given legal rights to “live at 
large,”174 nor could detainees be forced to demonstrate the impossibility of 
effectuating their removal.175 Meanwhile, however, the Court held that the 
judiciary should give “expert agencies decisionmaking leeway in matters 
that invoke their expertise,”176 an apparent effort to ensure that time limits 
were not a means of excising executive power, but of ensuring that justice 
is served. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s findings parallel holdings in Great Britain 
and Hong Kong. In the United Kingdom, Justice Woolf, in Regina v. 
Governor of Durham Prison, ex parte Hardial Singh,177 interpreted the 
UK Immigration Act of 1971 as authorizing detention that was “impliedly 
limited to a period which is reasonably necessary for [the] purpose” of 
“enabling the machinery of deportation to be carried out.”178 Hong Kong’s 
Privy Council echoed this finding in Tan Te Lam v. Superintendent of Tai 
A Chau Detention Centre.179 Explaining that detention must be reasonable, 
the Privy Council further stated that “if it becomes clear that removal is 
not going to be possible within a reasonable time, further detention is not 
authorised.”180 
Finally, if administrative authorities explicitly state (or imply) that 
punitive goals undergird a purported administrative detention, the 
detention is punitive even if concurrent non-punitive goals exist. The 
 171. Id. at 701. 
 172. Id. at 696. 
 173. Id. at 697. 
 174. Id. at 679. 
 175. Id. at 702. 
 176. Id. at 700. 
 177. Reg. v. Governor of Durham Prison, ex parte Hardial Singh (1984) 1 W.L.R. 704. 
 178. Al Masri, 192 A.L.R. ¶ 25. 
 179. Tan Te Lam v. Superintendent of Tai A Chau Detention Centre (1997) A.C. 97. 
 180. Id. at 111. 
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detention of unlawful boat arrivals, held to deter others from arriving 
unlawfully by boat, is one example.181 Holding detainees as punishment 
for having illegally arrived (by boat or other means) illustrates the non-
administrative character of their detention; applying Justice McHugh’s 
approach in Lim, it has a clear punitive object. Such detention is patently 
unlawful because it involves the Executive’s exercise of detention 
authority without any legislative mandate. It also contravenes the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Guidelines on 
Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum-
Seekers.182 Furthermore, because the detention is punitive, Chapter II of 
the Australian constitution gives the judiciary jurisdiction to review the 
detention.183 
These observations imply that individuals can be unlawfully held in 
immigration detention where a penal shift has occurred. These penal shifts 
occur when the length of the detention renders it punitive or the 
authorized, non-punitive administrative ends of the detention have been 
frustrated. These cases should be subject to judicial review, and, as 
required, the detentions should cease, even in the face of executive 
authorization. 
C. International Legal Arguments 
Finally, time limits can be implied within the new provisions of the 
Migration Act through international legal arguments. Australia is a 
member of many international organizations184 and party to international 
covenants that address immigration detention.185 The requirements of these 
 181. These arguments are suggested by public comments of Philip Ruddock. On August 1, 2002, 
for example, he stated the Department is “not about to unwind detention arrangements which . . . . 
[are] a very important deterrent in prevent [sic] people from getting into boats which we know can be 
life taking.” Detention as a deterrent may be unlawful (ABC Local Radio broadcast, Aug. 2, 2002), at 
http://www.abc.net.au/am/stories/s638106.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005). 
 182. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Revised Guidelines 
on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers, Guideline 3 (Feb. 
1999), available at www.inhcr.ch (last visited Mar. 19, 2005) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines]. 
 183. AUSTL. CONST. ch. III, § 73. See Lim, 176 C.L.R. at 65 (explaining that “[i]f a law 
authorizing the detention of an alien went beyond what was reasonably necessary to effect the 
deportation of that person, the law might be invalid because it infringed the provisions of Chapter III 
of the Constitution.”). 
 184. See, e.g., CROCK & SAUL, supra note 50, at 13, 14, and 19 (noting Australia’s membership in 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), where Australia is a member of the Executive 
Committee, and the U.N. Human Rights Committee). 
 185. See, e.g., id. at 13, 14, 17, and 19 (noting that Australia is a party to several international 
covenants dealing with immigration detention, including: the International Covenant of Civil & 
Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966); the 1951 Refugee Convention; and the Convention against Torture 
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memberships and agreements suggest that Australia has broken—or at 
least runs the risk of breaking—its international commitments if it does 
not implement guidelines preventing the indefinite detention of unlawful 
arrivals. 
The U.N. Human Rights Committee found, in April 1997, that 
Australia’s detention policy, as it operated before 1994, breached the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).186 While 
Australia has neither a constitutional nor statutory bill of rights, it has 
ratified the ICCPR, which guarantees the liberty of “all persons” in 
Australia and establishes that individuals cannot be detained arbitrarily.187 
Because detention had been imposed on all unauthorized arrivals without 
distinction and without administrative or judicial review,188 the Human 
Rights Committee considered the law arbitrary and violative of the 
ICCPR.189 
In A v. Australia, the Committee questioned whether Australia’s 
mandatory detention policy violated “article 9, paragraph 1, of the 
Covenant.”190 The Committee found that judicial review was necessary to 
confirm the lawfulness of detention.191 The Human Rights Committee thus 
observed that “every decision to keep a person in detention should be open 
to review periodically so that the grounds justifying the detention can be 
assessed.”192 It further noted that “detention should not continue beyond 
the period for which the State can provide appropriate justification.”193 
Thus, even if detention is authorized by law and is non-punitive and 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment). 
 186. A v. Australia, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., Communication No. 560/1993, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (1997).  
 187. Id. arts. 9(1), (4). Article 9(1) provides, that “[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security 
of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.” Id. 
art. 9(1). 
 Article 9(4) provides, that “[a]nyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be 
entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the 
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.” Id. art. 9(4). 
 188. See Amnesty International Australia, Submission to the National Inquiry into Children in 
Immigration Detention, available at http://www.humanrights.gov.au/human_rights/children_detention/ 
submissions/index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). 
 189. See A. v. Australia, supra note 186, ¶ 9.4.  
 190. Id. ¶ 9.1(a); see also Andrew N. Langham, The Erosion of Refugee Rights in Australia: Two 
Proposed Amendments to the Migration Act, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 651, 676 n.181 (1999). 
 191. See ICCPR, supra note 186, art. 9(4). 
 192. A. v. Australia, supra note 186, ¶ 9.4. 
 193. Id. See also Australian Section of the International Commission of Jurists, Submission to the 
National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention, available at http://www.humanrights.gov.au/ 
human_rights/children_detention /submissions/jurist.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). 
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administrative in character, the detention is arbitrary if it can continue 
indefinitely without curial review.  
One method of making detention less arbitrary is by adopting explicit 
time limits dictating how long individuals can be detained before being 
released. Numerous international legal sources support this conclusion. 
First, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights’ Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention (UNCHR Working Group) includes among its 
guarantees against arbitrariness that individuals are “not to be held in 
custody for an excessive or an unlimited period.”194 Indeed, it specifies 
that “a maximum period [should be] set, as appropriate, by the 
regulations.”195 Second, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child 
requires parties to ensure that “[n]o child [is] deprived of his or her liberty 
unlawfully or arbitrarily.”196 Specifically, the convention states that “the 
detention or imprisonment of a child . . . . shall be used only as a measure 
of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”197 
Finally, the prolonged detentions common under Australia’s Migration 
Act may violate other provisions of the ICCPR and Convention on the 
Rights of the Child that prohibit “torture,” and “cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”198 A 1996 report by the U.S. State 
Department noted that the majority of asylum seekers “are detained for the 
duration of the often-prolonged review process.”199 Indeed, the Australian 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) reported in 
1997 that “many of the conditions of detention . . . . become unacceptable 
 194. Amnesty International Australia, supra note 188, citing Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, Civil, and Political Rights, Including Questions of Torture and Detention, Report of the 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/63 (1998), ¶ 69, Guarantee 10. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 37(b), 1577 U.N.T.S. 44, 28 
I.L.M. 1457. Strikingly, only the United States of America and Somalia have not ratified the 
Convention as of Dec. 2, 2002. Australia ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990, 
though with reservations to article 37(c). United Nations Treaty Collection on the Internet, Multilateral 
Treaties Deposited with Secretary General: Convention on the Rights of the Child, Participants, at 
http://intreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty19.asp (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2005). 
 197. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 196, art. 37(a)–(b). 
 198. ICCPR, supra note 186, art. 7; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 196, art. 
37(a). 
 199. U.S. Department of State, Australia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996, available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/australi.html (last visited Mar. 14, 
2005). See also CROCK & SAUL, supra note 50, at 90–91. It is important to note that more recent 
reports fail to mention these issues. This may be due to Australia’s recent attempts to align its foreign 
policy with that of the United States, particularly with regard to Iraq. See Geoffrey Barker, Dare We 
Go All the Way With the USA, AUSTRALIA FINANCIAL REVIEW, Sept. 28, 2002, at 24. 
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. . . . when detention is prolonged thereby violating Australia’s own human 
rights commitments.”200 
IV. HIV AS AN ILLEGITIMATE JUSTIFICATION FOR PROLONGED 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
The preceding arguments suggest that detainees must be released from 
administrative detention after a limited period of time. Because the 
government cannot justify keeping illegal arrivals administratively 
detained forever, DIMIA may seek alternative justifications to prolong 
detention. This is particularly pressing now that an Australian court has 
assessed for the first time, in the Al Masri decision, whether the 
“reasonably practicable” standard had been met when it ordered a 
detainee’s release.201 Notably, the court limited its decision to Al-Masri’s 
particularly egregious case and refrained from addressing (or setting 
concrete limits on) the general circumstances under which individuals 
could remain detained.202 
Given the High Court’s suggestion in Lim that the administrative 
character of detention could change and that infectious diseases and public 
health grounds are legitimate justifications for change, DIMIA might use 
HIV/AIDS as a public health justification for prolonging the detention of 
infected illegal arrivals.203 Indeed, Lim essentially holds that the specific 
purposes of the law can relate to such issues as national security and 
public health. Under this logic, when the character of administrative 
detention changes via administrative shifts, security and public health 
grounds may serve as two forms of such change.204 This suggests public 
 200. Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (HREOC), Those Who’ve 
Come Across the Seas: Detention of Unauthorized Arrivals, Executive Summary, at iv, at 
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/pdf/human_rights/asylum_seekers/h5_2_2.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2005). 
The conditions noted by the HREOC included: (a) the failure to apprise individuals of legal counsel, 
(b) the use of force to restrain individuals and curb disturbances within detention centers, (c) the 
isolation of detainees, and (d) the failure to rectify generally poor living conditions with regard to 
food, medical services, clothing, education, privacy, and sleeping arrangements. Id. at iv. See also 
Angel Lewis, Australia’s Internal Dispute: Does the Mandatory Detention of Illegal Entrants Violate 
Human Rights, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 151 (1998); Louise Newman, The Right Human Cost of 
Detention, NEWCASTLE HERALD, Jan. 7, 2003, at 9 (questioning the effects of the detention conditions 
on the mental health and well-being of detainees); CROCK & SAUL, supra note 50, at 92. 
 201. Al Masri v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 192 
A.L.R. 609, ¶¶ 38–39 (finding the detainee should be released because there was no “reasonably 
practicable” likelihood that he would be released in the foreseeable future). 
 202. See id.  
 203. Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 
176 C.L.R. 1, 66. 
 204. Id. at 66–74 (discussing the difference between penal and non-penal detention, as well as 
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health grounds might be an inviting alternative ground for continued 
detention. Furthermore, among the most hotly contested issues among 
public health advocates—both in Australia and around the world—is how 
to manage AIDS and, more specifically, individuals who are HIV-positive. 
An obvious opportunity therefore presents itself to DIMIA: keeping illegal 
arrivals who are HIV-positive or have AIDS detained under a public 
health administrative exclusion. Such an approach seems straightforward, 
easily justified, and squarely under the ambit of DIMIA’s discretionary 
authority. This appears particularly true after examining Australia’s public 
health laws. 
A. Overview of HIV/AIDS & Public Health Law in Australia 
1. Historical Context 
Australia’s history of managing infectious diseases reminded 
government authorities of many precedents when AIDS first surfaced in 
the early 1980s.205 Ever since Britain’s founding of the Australian colonies 
in the late 1700s, Australian authorities viewed health care as one of the 
most important ways to ensure the safety of Australia’s residents.206 A 
portion of this sentiment certainly stemmed from Australia’s extraordinary 
isolation and inability to acquire swift assistance from Great Britain. 
Indeed, the fact that Australia’s aborigines were feared to carry unknown 
pathogens explains to some extent why they were kept separate from early 
settlers.207 Second, there was the simple fact that Australia was a penal 
colony during its first fifty years of colonial occupation, and appointed 
government authorities had the express responsibility to ensure the health 
of the prisoners. Australia’s Parliament passed the first Quarantine Act on 
July 28, 1832, largely in response to the cholera epidemic in Britain that 
claimed over 23,000 lives and was rumored to be headed toward 
Australia.208 A key goal was to ensure Australia was protected against 
diseases from afar; this theme of unfounded fears playing inflated roles 
would come to dominate public health policy in succeeding years. Indeed, 
Parliament’s constitutional ability to alter the purpose of non-penal detention). 
 205. See Peter Cuison, Spreading Disease: The Geography of AIDS, 3 VENEREOLOGY 71, 72 
(Aug. 1990). 
 206. See SIR RAPHAEL CILENTO, BLUEPRINT FOR THE HEALTH OF A NATION (1944). 
 207. See C. D. ROWLEY, THE DESTRUCTION OF ABORIGINAL SOCIETY 39 (1970). 
 208. Pub. N.S.W. Stat. 3 William iv, No. 1, 28-7-1832. The act was entitled “An Act for 
subjecting Vessels coming to New South Wales from certain places to the performance of 
Quarantine.” See JEAN DUNCAN FOLEY, IN QUARANTINE: A HISTORY OF SYDNEY’S QUARANTINE 
STATION 1828–1984, 19–20 (1995). 
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this fear ultimately became intertwined within Australia’s public health 
and immigration policies. 
Soon after Australian federation, a debate ensued over whether states 
or the central government should manage quarantine procedures. This 
debate led to quarantine centers being used by multiple authorities for 
multiple purposes, paralleling the ways DIMIA would later detain illegal 
arrivals with AIDS in immigration detention centers. During the smallpox 
epidemic of 1913, for example, the federal government made the 
unprecedented move of temporarily handing over the quarantine station in 
Sydney to the local government of New South Wales;209 this move was 
based largely on the belief that the state authorities knew better how to 
manage the local populace and had more legitimacy in the eyes of the 
families being ordered to leave their neighbors. In later years, authority 
over the quarantine station returned to the federal government, which used 
it for different purposes than those for which it was originally built. In 
April 1975, for example, 100 children rescued from Saigon were placed in 
two of the quarantine center’s hospital wards that had been converted into 
dormitories.210 Similarly, in June and July of 1977, the station provided 
temporary shelter to 125 boat people from Vietnam, as well as other illegal 
immigrants, until other arrangements could be made.211 The children 
remained there for thirteen days until homes could be found for them,212 
with others waiting somewhat longer. This illustrates the temporary nature 
of the accommodations, as well as the intersection of immigration, 
quarantine, and public health concerns. 
In line with its history of significant involvement in managing disease, 
the Australian government paid considerable attention to AIDS when the 
malady first appeared.213 This may explain why quarantine was so quickly 
suggested for AIDS sufferers,214 as it continued Australia’s tradition of 
using health laws and quarantine procedures to justify any activity under 
the pretense of protecting the public from feared foreign ills.215 
 209. Id. at 106–07. 
 210. Id. at 128. 
 211. Id. at 128 n.3. 
 212. Id. at 128. 
 213. See Dennis Altman, The Most Political of Diseases, in AIDS IN AUSTRALIA 55 (Eric 
Timewell et al. eds., 1992). See also Raymond Donovan, The Plaguing of a Faggot, the Leperising of 
a Whore: Criminally Cultured AIDS Bodies, and ‘Carrier Laws,’ in CULTURES OF CRIME AND 
VIOLENCE: THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 110 (Judith Bessant et al. eds., 1995). 
 214. See Edward A. Fallone, Preserving the Public Health: A Proposal to Quarantine 
Recalcitrant AIDS Carriers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 441 (1988). 
 215. Parallels can be drawn between the ways in which homosexuality was traditionally seen as a 
mental illness and was used to prevent individuals from entering industrialized nations like the United 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss2/4
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Throughout Australian history, the public increasingly believed disease 
to be connected with foreigners. Aborigines notwithstanding, non-
European immigrants were significantly feared by Australian settlers. As 
early as 1836, Australian colonies wrestled with determining means of 
ensuring immigrants were healthy and locating individuals in the penal 
establishments who had the requisite skills to transform the settlements 
into bona fide, full-fledged British colonies.216 The immigrants were 
prisoners, but the government hoped they had the gumption to transcend 
their predicaments,217 meaning individuals needed to arrive healthy and 
able to work. This was a significant challenge in light of the 
overcrowding, malnutrition, and infectious diseases that affected settlers 
on the long journey from Britain.218 The government subsequently 
imposed vigorous quarantine standards to separate those who were 
unhealthy from those able to work. Later, after Australia centralized 
control over its affairs in 1901, ensuring healthy immigrants remained a 
top priority. Generally, white immigrants were considered the healthiest 
immigrants, not to mention the strongest and the brightest.219  
The parallels between race and HIV/AIDS vis-à-vis immigration policy 
in Australia are striking. Australia, like the United States, focused 
significantly on barring immigrants of different races from immigrating to 
its shores during the twentieth century.220 The panic surrounding AIDS in 
States. See Christopher A. Dueñas, Coming to America: The Immigration Obstacle Facing Bi-national 
Same-Sex Couples, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2000). Today, the U.S. approaches to lesbian and gay 
asylees still fail to comport with local laws and customs. See Lucy H. Halatyn, Political Asylum and 
Equal Protection: Hypocrisy of United States Protection of Gay Men and Lesbians, 22 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 133 (1998); John A. Russ, IV, The Gap Between Asylum Ideals and Domestic 
Reality: Evaluating Human Rights Conditions for Gay Americans by the United States’ Own 
Progressive Asylum Standards, 4 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 29 (1998). 
 216. FOLEY, supra note 208, at 24. 
 217. Much like the re-education campaigns among Chinese bourgeosie banished to the 
countryside during the Cultural Revolution, the prisoners in Australia were envisaged—consistent with 
the observations of Max Weber—to bring a Protestant work ethic to fruition in illustrating their 
predestined worth. See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPRIT OF 
CAPITALISM (Roxbury Pub. Co. 2002) (1864) (discussing ways in which one’s predetermined fate after 
death—namely, heaven or hell—could be determined by one’s financial successes. Weber argued that 
this ethic drove economic activity as individuals were implicitly compelled to work hard, achieve 
economic success, and obtain the predetermined signs that they had been saved by God). See also GAO 
YUAN, BORN RED (1987) (discussing the pogroms carried out by the Red Guards under Mao Zedong’s 
command to purge the People’s Republic of China of “bad elements,” including the bourgeosie, 
intellectuals, and Communist-party intelligentia who were determined to have pursued counter-
revolutionary ideals). 
 218. See FOLEY, supra note 208, at 47.  
 219. DIANE KIRKBY, OF PEOPLE AND PLACE: DEBATES OVER AUSTRALIA’S IMMIGRATION 
PROGRAM FROM 1939, 55 (1997). 
 220. See Joan Fitzpatrick & William Mckay Bennett, A Lion in the Path? The Influence of 
International Law on the Immigration Policy of the United States, 70 WASH. L. REV. 589 (1995). 
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Australia resembled Australia’s response to the smallpox epidemic of 
1881; instead of just targeting Chinese people, however, individuals of 
“foreign” races and nationalities were also singled out.221 Furthermore, just 
as the Chinese began viewing themselves as inferior to the dominant 
culture because of the diseases they carried, so, too, were they 
subordinated by the dominant Australian culture.222 By applying this 
concept of “multiple marginalized identities” to HIV-positive 
individuals,223 one can see how DIMIA’s marginalizing HIV-positive and 
AIDS-infected individuals from abroad through prolonged administrative 
detention procedures is consistent with historical precedents. 
2. Legal Lenses 
The health exclusions in Australia’s current immigration laws reflect a 
policy of marginalization in determining who should be granted visas and 
who should be given waivers for statutorily mandated health exclusions. 
These immigration laws afford significant discretion to the Minister of 
DIMIA. Indeed, following the explosion in refugee applications and cases 
in the early 1990s224 as well as increasing attempts by refugee advocates to 
overcome health exclusions—the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) 
explained that the discretion of officers conducting the reviews was 
paramount t the system’s effective operation.225 In light of this statement, 
one may be led to believe that the Minister and his representatives could 
use this discretion to justify the continued detention of individuals with 
HIV/AIDS. 
 221. See P. H. CURSON, TIMES OF CRISIS: EPIDEMICS IN SYDNEY: 1788–1900, xi, 87 (1985) 
(noting how the smallpox epidemic of 1881–82 became “inexorably intertwined with the issue of 
Chinese immigration and a concentrated campaign of abuse was directed against Sydney’s Chinese. 
Much was made of their apparent susceptibility to diseases such as plague, leprosy, and smallpox.”). 
 222. See Peter Margulies, Asylum, Intersectionality, and AIDS: Women with HIV as a Persecuted 
Social Group, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 521, 522 (1994) (discussing the ways individuals can be 
subordinated by a dominant culture when multiple labels—often negative—are employed to define 
their identity). 
 223. Id. (applying principles of intersectionality theory to issues concerning HIV-positive 
individuals, as well as issues of race, class, and gender). 
 224. See CROCK, supra note 35, at 60. 
 225. Re Papaioannou (1991) I.R.T. v90/00215. These findings were echoed in Re Dusa (1991) 
I.R.T. 285. 
Waiver provisions clearly envisage that a certain level of harm and/or cost can be endured by 
the Australian community . . . . as long as [it] . . . . is not unjustified . . . . An applicant could 
be found to have a disease . . . . which may require significant care or treatment, or the use of 
community resources in short supply . . . . and notwithstanding these findings, it is envisaged 
that a decision maker may still find that undue harm or undue cost is unlikely to result to the 
Australian community. 
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Australia’s health exclusions, outlined in the Migration Regulations, 
establish a series of key health-related criteria that must be met to get a 
visa.226 In essence, these regulations address four key issues. A visa 
applicant must not have (i) a “disease or condition,” which (ii) is a threat 
to Australia’s public health, or (iii) requires health care or community 
services that would likely produce significant costs for the Australian 
community, or (iv) prejudices the access of Australian citizens and 
permanent residents to health services.227 These health provisions apply to 
all of the 118 visa subclasses.228 Twenty-nine of these subclasses include 
an additional provision giving the minister discretion to “waive the 
requirements of paragraph (1)(c)” if certain conditions are met.229 Even if 
all other criteria for the visa are satisfied,230 “the Minister must be satisfied 
that the granting of the visa is unlikely to result in . . . . undue cost to the 
Australian community[,] or undue prejudice to the access of health care or 
community services of all Australian citizen or permanent resident.”231 
Three additional provisions help to clarify how the Immigration 
Review Tribunal (IRT) has excluded individuals with HIV/AIDS. For the 
Minister to have discretion to waive the health requirements, the applicant 
 226. Migration Regulations, § 4005. The regulations specifically require that an applicant: 
(a) is free from tuberculosis; 
(b) is free from a disease or condition that is, or may result in the applicant being, a threat to 
public health in Australia or a danger to the Australian community; and 
(c) is not a person who has a disease or condition to which the following subparagraphs 
apply: 
(i) the disease or condition is such that a person who has it would be likely to: 
(A) require health care or community services; or 
(B) meet the medical criteria for the provision of a community service during the period of 
the applicant’s proposed stay in Australia; 
(ii) provision of the health care or community services relating to the disease or condition 
would be likely to:  
(A) result in a significant cost to the Australian community in the areas of health care 
and community services; or  
(B) prejudice the access of an Australian citizen or permanent resident to health care or 
community services; regardless of whether the health care of community services will 
actually be used in connection with the applicant; and 
(d) [if the applicant promised to appear for a required medical check-up, they have done so]. 
 227. Bui v. Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) F.C.A. 118. 
 228. See Migration Regulations, sched. 2 (listing every visa sub-class by number and qualitative 
designation (e.g., “Parent” (subclass 103), “Medical Treatment–Short Stay” (subclass 675), “Religious 
Worker” (subclass 428), and “Prospective Marriage Spouse” (subclass 831)). 
 229. See generally Migration Regulations, scheds. 1, 2 (detailing the specific requirements and 
provisions of each visa subclass). 
 230. Migration Regulations, § 4007 (containing provisions identical to § 4005 with the “waiver 
provision” added). 
 231. Id. 
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first cannot have a “disease or condition” that poses a threat to Australia’s 
public health.”232 In essence, a disease or condition is something that 
cannot be ameliorated, and to a certain degree has either resulted in (or is 
likely to result in) a permanent disability that can neither be overcome nor 
cured.233 HIV/AIDS clearly satisfies this definition as a cure continues to 
elude medical researchers, leaving HIV/AIDS a “serious, difficult-to-treat 
and ultimately fatal disease.”234 
Second, waiver is only possible if the Minister concludes that the 
applicant does not represent an “undue burden on the Australian 
community.”235 As provided by the Migration Act, there are two distinct 
ways to evaluate whether granting a visa to a specific applicant would be 
an “undue burden” on Australia.236 The first is to assess whether there 
would be undue cost to the Australian community,237 while the second is 
to consider whether granting the visa would unduly prejudice the access of 
Australian citizens or permanent residents to health care or community 
services.238 When courts assess the undue burden present in individual 
cases, however, they treat the statute as if it were written in the 
conjunctive, rather than in the disjunctive manner in which it is actually 
written.239  
Interpreting these standards is critical as any individuals potentially 
subject to continued mandatory detention due to their HIV/AIDS status 
must prove they qualify for a health waiver based upon a determination 
that obtaining a visa would not result in any undue costs or prejudice.240 In 
Bui, for example, the High Court pointedly criticized the IRT for failing to 
consider the individual circumstances of a Vietnamese man denied a 
family reunion visa on the basis of his “borderline intellectual 
 232. See CROCK, supra note 35, at 57–61. 
 233. Notwithstanding the extraordinary amount of leeway contained in this definition, examples 
of “diseases” and “conditions” include mental retardation (as opposed to lower than average 
intelligence) and paraplegia (as opposed to childhood poliomyetlitis). See Re Nguyen (1995) I.R.T. 
5667. See also Russell Skelton, Living Life Neither Here Nor There, THE AGE, Feb. 18, 2003, at 13. 
 234. See Anne Christiansen Bullers, Living with AIDS—20 Years Later, FDA CONSUMER, Nov.–
Dec. 2001, at 30, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2001/601_aids.html (last visited Feb. 
11, 2004). 
 235. See Migration Act, supra note 32, § 4007(2)(b). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. § 4007(2)(b)(i). 
 238. Id. § 4007(2)(b)(ii). 
 239. See, e.g., In re Lu (1991) I.R.T. 207; In re Yatim (1995) I.R.T. 5157 (evaluating both of the 
subprovisions that would constitute an undue burden). 
 240. The only way in which individuals subject to detention on the basis of the HIV/AIDS status 
could secure release from the Department of Immigration is to be granted a visa; therefore, the 
Department would need to illustrate that they were not authorized to receive a visa because they did 
not meet the standards established under the waiver provisions in § 4007 of the Migration Regulations. 
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functioning.”241 The court found evidence that the applicant would burden 
the health care system and be a significant cost to the Australian 
government;242 the court then remanded the case to DIMIA to review its 
previous decision not to waive the medical requirements for the 
applicant’s admission.243 Justice French found, that: 
There are obviously broad judgments to be made in determining 
what amounts to “undue cost” and “undue prejudice”. Reading . . . . 
the criteria . . . . it is apparent that the occasion for the exercise of 
the waiver will only arise where it is already established that the 
cost to Australia, if the visa is granted, is likely to be “significant.” 
The Minister will therefore need to be satisfied that a likely 
“significant” cost will nevertheless not be “undue.” In the former 
determination he or she is evidently to be bound by the opinion of a 
Medical Officer of the Commonwealth.  
 The evaluative judgment whether the cost to the Australian 
community or prejudice to others, if the visa is granted, is “undue” 
may import consideration of compassion or other circumstances. It 
may be to Australia’s benefit in moral or other terms to admit a 
person even though it could be anticipated that such a person will 
make some significant call upon health and community services. 
There may be circumstances of a “compelling” character, not 
included in the “compassionate” category that mandate such an 
outcome. But over and above the consideration of the likelihood 
that cost or prejudice will be “undue” there is the discretionary 
element of the ministerial waiver. And within that discretion 
compassionate circumstances or the more widely expressed 
“compelling circumstances” may properly have a part to play.244 
In the wake of the High Court’s holding in Bui, the IRT has found itself 
wrestling continually with what is and is not “undue,” waffling with 
regard to applicants with HIV/AIDS and the costs Australia would incur to 
care for those individuals. Most often, the discussion has come down to 
bare-bones calculations and estimates of the anticipated cost to care for 
someone with HIV/AIDS, with the figures ranging widely and wildly. In 
Visa Applicant S, for example, the Tribunal allowed an HIV-positive 
 241. See Bui (1999) F.C.A. ¶ 54. 
 242. Id. ¶¶ 43, 64(3). 
 243. Id. ¶ 66. 
 244. Id. ¶¶ 46–47. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p263 Lopez article book pages.doc 4/26/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
300 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:263 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fijian man to stay with his Australian wife, despite the fact that lifetime 
cost for his care had an estimated range from A$93,000 to A$2,160,000.245 
In Re SS,246 the IRT decided not to grant a spousal visa on the grounds that 
the applicant’s husband was not working and it would cost over 
A$250,000 for his lifetime care.247 In Re PPG, the IRT granted the HIV-
positive applicant an interdependency visa despite the fact that cost 
estimates ranged from A$39,000 to A$239,000;248 the applicant’s monthly 
income of A$24,000 and assets of US$5,800,000 in the United States 
played a critical role in the IRT’s findings that the “undue” burden was 
moot.249 Other examples include Re MC,250 where an interdependency visa 
was denied, with the court citing lifetime healthcare costs of A$400,000, 
and Re PF,251 where an interdependency visa was granted, with the court 
citing lifetime healthcare costs of A$240,000. 
Trying to make sense of the morass, the IRT in 2001 commented that: 
“Undue” is not defined in the Migration Act or Regulations. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines “undue” as not in accordance 
with what is just or right, unjustifiable, and going beyond what is 
appropriate, warranted or natural, excessive. The assessment as to 
what constitutes undue cost must take account of all relevant . . . . 
and compelling circumstances.252 
The RRT further attempted to clarify the importance of an applicant’s 
wealth while maintaining the Minister’s complete discretion. It was not 
until April 2001, however, that the RRT finally noted for the first time that 
the traditional approaches to calculating the total health care costs of 
HIV/AIDS patients had become increasingly irrelevant.253 In its decision, 
the Tribunal quoted the head of HIV services at the Alfred Hospital as 
stating: 
 245. Visa Applicant S, IRT N94/01389 (1995) I.R.T.A. 6005. Annual cost estimates further 
ranged from A$14,500 to A$45,000. Id. 
 246. Re SS (2001) M.R.T.A. 2322. 
 247. Id. ¶ 48. It is interesting to note that the IRT explicitly noted that the applicant was originally 
from Thailand, and that she had met her husband in the “Bourbon and Beefsteak Bar,” (Id. ¶ 11). This 
leads one to wonder whether this fact—and the assumptions made in many Western countries about 
Bangkok bars, Thai women, and prostitution—prejudiced the IRT’s decision. 
 248. Re PGG (2000) M.R.T.A. 386, ¶ 12.  
 249. Id. ¶ 18. 
 250. Re MC (2001) M.R.T.A. 0330, ¶ 20. 
 251. Re PF (2001) M.R.T.A. 5304, ¶¶ 10, 39. 
 252. Re SS (2001) M.R.T.A. 2322, ¶ 46. 
 253. Re LSD (2001) M.R.T.A. 1316. 
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Clearly the introduction of highly active antiretroviral therapy or 
combination . . . . therapy which occurred . . . . [in] 1996 has made a 
substantial difference to HIV infection and disease . . . There has 
been a huge reduction in AIDS illnesses and deaths from that period 
of time . . . .  
 Thus the highly expensive costs in the former studies of the mid-
1990s are no longer relevant to the current practice of HIV 
medicine. These costs—i.e., hospitalisation, terminal care, treatment 
of opportunistic infections, and day facilities for infusions of 
antimicrobials—have all been largely superseded . . . . [and] 
patients with normal immune function and undetectable Viral Load 
will not pose any burden of illness costs on the HIV community 
beyond the combination therapy itself and monitoring tests . . . . The 
majority of individuals with HIV infection are now working full-
time, living full and healthy lives albeit attempting to deal with the 
burden of medications and some of the side effects . . . . In relation 
to [the applicant] LSD . . . . he has fulfilled the very best criteria for 
response to treatment. He has normal immune function, 
undetectable virus and he clearly will not pose a significant cost to 
the Australian community in the medium term future.254 
The IRT wrestled with the A$240,000 figure255 that had been cited in other 
decisions and concluded it was balanced by other factors that would not 
make it “undue.”256 
The upshot of this analysis is that the Refugee Review Tribunal has 
sought to recognize the discretion of DIMIA executives in determining 
who is eligible for health exclusions, though the RRT also has illustrated 
in the wake of Bui that these grounds must be solidly laid. Furthermore, 
the importance of “compassion” in the determination calculus is also 
important, as evidenced by Justice French’s comments in Bui and the 
IRT’s findings in Re PF, holding that what is undue “may import 
consideration of compassionate . . . . circumstances.”257 This, of course, 
did not stop the Tribunal recently from denying asylum to an HIV-positive 
Indian man in Re Applicant N97258 and an Indonesian woman in Re 
 254. Id. ¶ 20. 
 255. Id. ¶ 30. 
 256. Id. ¶¶ 31–36 (listing factors such as (a) the extent and cost of medical, social, or other 
institutional assistance, (b) the occupational needs of the applicant, (c) the potential for the applicant’s 
health to deteriorate, and (d) the merits of the case). 
 257. Re PF (2001) M.R.T.A. 5304, ¶ 35. 
 258. Re Applicant N97 (1998) R.R.T. N97/20754. 
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Applicant N98.259 In both cases, the Tribunal found that rejection on the 
basis of HIV-positive status alone did not amount to discrimination under 
the Refugee Convention.260 In each case, the individuals were ordered to 
leave Australia immediately.  
Controlling HIV/AIDS remains a significant concern of Australian 
immigration policy. In Australia, AIDS diagnoses have leveled off261 and 
the incidence rate is lower than in other Western industrialized 
countries.262 The rates in other Asia-Pacific nations from which significant 
emigration to Australia occurs, however, is substantial.263 Transmission 
rates in Australia are also higher for individuals born outside Australia, the 
United Kingdom, and Europe than for individuals born in Australia.264 
Finally, although the factors determining who is most likely to contract 
AIDS are still undetermined,265 the disease still primarily affects 
homosexual men.266 This convergence of AIDS, race, class, and social 
groups warrants concern.267 Even more troublesome, though, is the 
application of Australia’s health exclusions to individuals with HIV/AIDS, 
and, in particular, its potential failure to comply with basic human rights 
requirements.268 
 259. Re Applicant N98 (1999) R.R.T. N98/22232. 
 260. See Refugee Convention, supra note 15. 
 261. NATIONAL CENTRE IN HIV EPIDEMIOLOGY AND CLINICAL RESEARCH, HIV/AIDS, VIRAL 
HEPATITIS & SEXUALLY TRANSMISSIBLE INFECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA: ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE 
REPORT 2002 [hereinafter ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT 2002], HIV/AIDS diagnoses in Australia, 
at http://www.med.unsw.edu.au/nchecr/Downloads/AHSR2002pres/sld001.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 
2005) (illustrating the current trend of HIV infectious and AIDS diagnoses in Australia). 
 262. ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT 2002, supra note 261, AIDS in selected industrialized 
countries by year, at http://www.med.unsw.edu.au/nchecr/Downloads/AHSR2002pres/sld007.htm 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2005) (comparing Australia’s HIV incidence rate to other major industrialized 
countries from 1992–2001). 
 263. ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT 2002, supra note 261, HIV prevalence in selected countries 
in the Asia-Pacific region, at http://www.med.unsw.edu.au/nchecr/Downloads/AHSR2002pres/ 
sld008.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005) (comparing Australia’s HIV prevalence rate to the incidence 
rates of other countries in the Asia-Pacific region). 
 264. ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT 2002, supra note 261, AIDS incidence in Australia, 1991–
2001, by year and region of birth, at http://www.med.unsw.edu.au/nchecr/Downloads/ 
AHSR2002pres/sld006.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005) (comparing the rates of HIV transmission 
among individuals in Australia, by birthplace). 
 265. Nick Crofts, Patterns of Infection, in AIDS IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 213, at 24, 28. 
 266. ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT 2002, supra note 261, AIDS diagnoses, 1997–2001, by HIV 
exposure category, at http://www.med.unsw.edu.au/nchecr/Downloads/AHSR2002pres/sld004.htm 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2005) (illustrating that diagnosed AIDS cases in Australia typically come from 
male homosexual contact). 
 267. See Michael Helfin et al., Recent Developments in International Law: Symposium 
Proceedings, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 169, 199 (2001) (discussing how HIV-positive 
individuals can be seen as legitimate members of a social group for refugee purposes under the 1957 
Convention). 
 268. See Australian National Council on AIDS, Hepatitis C, and Related Diseases, ANCAHRD 
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B. Arguments Supporting the HIV/AIDS Justification: Law, Domestic 
Policy, International Precedents, Pragmatism, and History 
Several theoretical arguments can be advanced to justify granting 
discretion to the Minister of DIMIA to continue administrative detention 
of illegal arrivals with HIV/AIDS. These arguments arise from the nature 
and purpose of laws protecting public health, the actions of other leading 
industrialized democracies, and fundamental and pragmatic concerns over 
the spread of HIV/AIDS. While DIMIA’s actions are consistent with 
Australia’s historical approach to managing its borders through the now-
abandoned White Australia Policy, the basic premise of this argument 
certainly resides in the Australian government’s ability to exercise control 
over its borders.  
First, as mentioned, Australian immigration law grants the Minister of 
Immigration exclusive discretionary authority to waive health 
requirements or, alternatively, deny a visa for failure to satisfy these health 
requirements. Individuals with HIV/AIDS are thus considered to have a 
“disease or condition” that would bar them from entry to Australia if they 
do not qualify for the health waiver provisions of the Migration Act.269 
Both the IRT and the High Court have upheld the Minister’s right to 
utilize his discretion as he sees fit, and there is no reason to believe this 
will change. This executive authority allowing the Minister to detain 
illegal arrivals is explicitly granted and, in fact, its exercise required by the 
Migration Act. The recent introduction of privative clauses270 into the 
Migration Act supports this view. These privative clauses require that 
immigration detention decisions, as of 2001, “must not be challenged, 
appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question by any court.”271  
Ultimately, to detain an individual, DIMIA needs only to find that the 
individual has HIV/AIDS and that the detention is necessary to prevent the 
spread of the virus.272 To be justified, the detention must shift 
Annual Report 2000–2001, at 22, at http://www.ancahrd.org/pubs/pdfs/report00.pdf (last visited Mar. 
20, 2005) [hereinafter ANCAHRD Report]. 
 269. Migration Act, § 4007. 
 270. This term is used throughout Australian law to connote any statutory provision limiting 
judicial review. Webster’s Dictionary defines the term as an adjective meaning, “causing deprivation, 
lack, or loss,” or alternatively, “altering the meaning of a term from positive to negative.” WEBSTER’S 
II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 880 (2001). 
 271. Migration Act, § 474(b). The Federal Court has noted, however, that these privative clauses 
cannot prevent it from granting relief in habeas corpus cases. Al-Masri v. Minister of Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) F.C.A. 1009. 
 272. See Hnin Hnin Pyne, International Law & the Rights of People Living with HIV/AIDS, in 
CONFRONTING AIDS: EVIDENCE FROM THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Martha Ainsworth et al. eds., 
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administratively from the initial immigration rationale. This poses 
significant questions about the executive’s ability to continue exercising 
control over individuals when the grounds upon which that authority was 
initially granted have changed. Despite this difficulty, courts have 
traditionally deferred to the executive’s assumed expertise to achieve the 
executive’s ends—at least to the extent those ends are explicitly authorized 
by Parliament. 
A second line of argument supporting DIMIA’s continued detention of 
individuals with HIV/AIDS stems from the state’s role in ensuring the 
public health and safety of its people. In its purest form, this implies that a 
federally empowered executive should prevent the entry of any individual 
who poses a public health risk to the nation’s citizenry. Public health laws 
are fundamentally “intended to protect the community from exposure to 
health and safety risks.”273 They deal, therefore, with a “broad range of 
subjects,”274 including determining which non-citizens should be allowed 
to enter the country. Public health rationales, in fact, have provided a 
legitimate basis for the state to deprive individuals of liberty through 
quarantine and internment, particularly those with communicable diseases. 
Rules, however, need to be in place to ensure these actions are reasonable, 
not arbitrary, and comport with due process of law.275  
Third, other nations’ use of administrative detention may be used to 
justify similar practices by DIMIA. In a survey of ninety-three low- and 
middle-income countries in 1996, eight countries had admitted people 
with AIDS into special centers and eleven countries had laws prescribing 
“compulsory confinement or quarantine.”276 While some countries enforce 
these laws restricting the freedom of movement of people with 
HIV/AIDS,277 others do not.278 Some countries detain persons with AIDS 
1998). 
 273. GREGORY TILLETT, AIDS & THE WORKPLACE: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 139 (1989). 
 274. Id. 
 275. In the case of HIV/AIDS, the WHO recommends that “persons suspected or known to be 
HIV-infected should remain integrated within society to the maximum possible extent and be helped to 
assume responsibility for HIV transmission to others.” Report of the Secretary-General on 
International and Domestic Measures Taken to Protect Human Rights and Prevent Discrimination in 
the Context of HIV/AIDS, U.N. Economic an Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 51st 
Sess., § 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/45, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/ 
0182b067cfb1dcf1858025670d003babdb?opendocument (last visited Feb. 11, 2005) [hereinafter U.N. 
Human Rights Commission Report]. 
 276. See Pyne, supra note 272, at 85. 
 277. Examples include Azerbaijan, Algeria, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, and Malaysia. 
Id. 
 278. Examples include Costa Rica, Senegal, Russia, Jordan, and Syria. Id. 
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without any legislative provisions whatsoever.279 Canada, for example, has 
prevented individuals with HIV/AIDS from entering the country.280 
Additionally, UNAIDS has recognized limited ways in which criminal 
detention can be used to manage HIV.281 It grounds its recommendations 
in several guiding principles. First, the state must ensure that preventing 
the spread of HIV/AIDS is the primary goal of the detention policy.282 
Second, the policy must be imbued with respect for human rights.283 And 
third, the policy must clearly justify any infringement of human rights.284 
Therefore, if DIMIA coupled the arguably legitimate purpose of protecting 
public health with regular review of its detentions, it is possible that 
extended detention for individuals with HIV/AIDS could be justified to 
the extent that the UNAIDS report represents legitimating international 
precedent. 
Fourth, pragmatic public health concerns support DIMIA subjecting 
individuals with HIV/AIDS to continued administrative detention. 
International travel, for example, is well-documented as a significant 
means of HIV/AIDS transmission. Indeed, HIV most likely came to 
Australia in 1980 or 1981 from California,285 with the first diagnosis in 
December 1982.286 Overseas contact has also fueled heterosexual HIV 
infections among Australians.287 Current incidence rates are also linked to 
national origin. Data from Africa and South America drive Australian 
 279. Venezuela and Mali are examples. Id. 
 280. See Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, at http://www.aidslw.ca/Maincontent/issues/ 
Immigration/finalreport/currentpolicy.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2004). 
 281. Richard Elliot, U.N. Program On HIV/AIDS, Criminal Law, Public Health and HIV 
Transmission: A Policy Options Paper, at 10, U.N. Doc. UNAIDS/02.12E (2002), available at 
http://www.unaids.org/htmlpublications/irc-pub02/JC733-CriminalLaw-en-pdf/nav.htm (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2005). 
 282. Id. at 15. 
 283. Id. at 15–17. 
 284. Id. at 17–20. 
 285. Nick Crofts, Patterns of Infection, in AIDS IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 213, at 33, citing 
Cuison, supra note 205, at 71–72. 
 286. Crofts, supra note 285, at 52 n.44, citing NHMRC Working Party, Acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS), 141 MED. J. AUS. 561, 561–68 (1984). See also Rob Moodie, The 
Situation Now and Possible Futures, in NO PLACE FOR BORDERS: THE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 24, 30 (Godfrey Linge & Doug Porter eds., 1997). 
 287. “Australian” is used here to denote individuals in Australia who are reporting their positive 
HIV-status; it does not denote individuals’ citizenship or residency status. See ANNUAL 
SURVEILLANCE REPORT 2002, supra note 261, HIV prevalence among people seen at sexual health 
clinics, at http://www.med.unsw.edu.au/nchecr/Downloads/AHSR2002pres/sld030.htm (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2005) (highlighting how overseas heterosexual contact, particularly among women, has fueled 
HIV infections among people visiting Australian health clinics). 
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fears that individuals from those countries are more likely to carry and 
spread the disease within Australia.288  
Retroviral medications notwithstanding, the data suggest that more 
HIV-positive individuals will develop AIDS as time passes.289 Given the 
widespread incidence of HIV/AIDS in the Asia-Pacific region,290 it is not 
surprising that Australia would be concerned about the number of 
immigrants coming from these countries291 because they as a group are 
more likely to spread HIV and eventually develop AIDS, thereby 
potentially placing an additional burden on the already overburdened 
Australian health care system. Furthermore, as modern medicine increases 
the lifespan of infected individuals, this burden will likely last for longer 
periods of time.292 
Finally, the context and history surrounding any initiative to use 
HIV/AIDS as a justification for detaining illegal arrivals may make the 
justification seem unpalatable; such justification, however, appears to 
comport with Australia’s current Liberal regime.293 Historically, 
Australia’s primary goal in increasing immigration after federation of the 
country was to create a “White” Australia.294 This policy was effectuated 
through a dictation test in which foreigners were told to transcribe a 
 288. See ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT 2002, supra note 261, AIDS incidence in Australia, 
1991–2001, by year and region of birth, at http://www.med.unsw.edu.au/nchecr/Downloads/ 
AHSR2002pres/sld006.htm. See also G. Dore et al., Spectrum of AIDS-Defining Illnesses in Australia, 
1992 to 1998: Influence of Country/Region of Birth, 26 J. ACQUIR. IMMUNE DEFIC. SYNDR. 283 
(2001). 
 289. See Crofts, supra note 285, at 28 (noting that after ten years, up to fifty percent of HIV-
infected individuals will have developed AIDS). 
 290. The Australian Red Cross has noted that “it is estimated that in the next [ten] years the spread 
of AIDS in Asia may eclipse the 22.5 million cases in Sub-Saharan Africa and become the largest 
regional epidemic in the world–mostly due to population density.” Australian Red Cross, HIV/AIDS in 
the Asia-Pacific Region, Oct. 8, 2001, available at http://1.redcross.org.au/?Fuseaction= 
NEWSROOM.archive&sub=29 (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). 
 291. DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, SETTLER 
ARRIVALS 1993–1994 TO 2003–2004, 3 (2004) (summarizing arrival statistics of immigrants to 
Australia by birthplace). 
 292. See ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT 2002, supra note 261, Survival following AIDS, at 
http://www.med.unsw.edu.au/nchecr/Downloads/AHSR2002pres/sld036.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 
2005) (illustrating that the survival rates of individuals living with AIDS have been largely increasing 
over the 1990s). 
 293. Political parlance in Australia differs significantly from that used in other industrialized 
countries. For example, although the Democratic party in the United States is oft-termed “liberal,” 
Australia’s Liberal party is more synonymous with U.S. Republican ideology. The Australian Labour 
party, which is similar in ideology to the U.S. Democratic Party, currently heads the opposition. 
 294. See Mary Crock, Apart from Us or a Part of Us? Immigrant’s Rights, Public Opinion, and 
the Rule of Law, 10 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 49, 53 (1998) (referencing “Australia’s somewhat 
xenophobic beginnings”). 
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paragraph read in a European language.295 This test was described by the 
HREOC in 1985 as a perfect example of legislation enabling the executive 
to implement its “White” policy.296 Though the Migration Act of 1958 
abolished the test, the level of discretion given to the Minister allowed 
DIMIA to continue to advance the “White” policy.297 Over time racial 
discrimination policies were increasingly relaxed, until the policy was 
formally abolished in 1973.298  
The current Liberal government, however, is suspected of wanting to 
reintroduce racially discriminatory policies.299 Although not as blatant as a 
policy basing visa decisions explicitly on racial grounds, a conflation of 
HIV/AIDS status, ethnicity, and national origin would allow Australia to 
accomplish the same ends by requiring the continued detention of illegal 
arrivals with HIV/AIDS in the name of public health and safety. 
C. Arguments Against the HIV/AIDS Justification 
The arguments and rationales for using HIV/AIDS to justify prolonged 
administrative detention of illegal arrivals are destined to falter for one 
fundamental reason: they fail to consider the legal and social contexts in 
which they must be exercised. The discretion of the Minister of DIMIA is 
not unbounded because the judiciary remains a check on his discretion. If 
prolonged detention becomes penal in character, Chapter III of the 
constitution applies and ministerial discretion alone is insufficient to 
justify prolonging such detention.300 Furthermore, within Australia, 
detention has been decidedly discounted as an effective management tool 
except in the most extreme cases. The illegitimacy of HIV/AIDS as a 
justification for prolonging the administrative detention of illegal arrivals, 
however, becomes most clear through an analysis of the laws of various 
Australian states, Australian Commonwealth law, international law, and 
Australian social mores. 
 295. Immigration Restriction Act, 1901, § 3(a) (Austl.). 
 296. HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION OF AUSTRALIA, REPORT NO. 13: 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MIGRATION ACT OF 1958 (Apr. 1985), ¶ 17. 
 297. Id. ¶ 18. 
 298. Gianni Zappala & Stephen Castles, Citizenship and Immigration in Australia, 13 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 273, 279–80 (1999). It was only at that time that all permanent migrants were allowed to 
become citizens within three years and overseas posts were directed to disregard race as a factor in 
issuing visas. Id. 
 299. Irmgard Glende et al., Statue of Stature, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 26, 1997, at 12. 
 300. See Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Immigration Local Government and Ethnic Affairs 
(1992) 176 C.L.R. 1, 27. 
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1. Health & Non-Discrimination Guidelines in State Law 
Arguments against the legitimacy of the HIV/AIDS justification are 
first grounded in state and territory, rather than federal, law. Local 
governments have historically managed the bulk of Australian public 
health and discrimination issues.301 The federal government has deferred 
to states and territories largely because local municipalities are seen as 
better able to act swiftly and deliberately in a public health crisis than the 
federal government.302 Additionally, local governments have always been 
the focus of Australian identity.303 For example, soon after AIDS was 
identified in Australia, state-sponsored AIDS councils were created in 
every state and territory304 and the federal government consciously ceded 
management of AIDS programs to the states and territories.305 
This decentralization, however, has often produced a disparate array of 
approaches to public health and discrimination issues.306 In particular, 
there has been little national uniformity in “most areas touched on by the 
AIDS epidemic.”307 In Queensland, for example, the names of HIV-
positive individuals are collected and reported to the central health 
authority;308 meanwhile, Victoria has strong statutory confidentiality 
guarantees.309 Despite these differences, trends exist that could inform 
Australian courts adjudicating the legality of continued administrative 
detention of illegal arrivals with HIV/AIDS.  
a. Public Health Legislation 
Generally, Australian states and territories have viewed themselves as 
responsible for ensuring that potential health threats are addressed as 
swiftly as possible. Thus, state and territory legislation has focused on 
identifying and tracking public health threats,310 as well as ameliorating 
 301. Roger S. Magnusson, A Decade of HIV Testing in Australia, Part I: A Review of Current 
Legal Requirements, 18 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 341 (1995). 
 302. Id.  
 303. Id. at 348. 
 304. Id.  
 305. Altman, supra note 213, at 63. 
 306. Magnusson, supra note 301, at 345. 
 307. Altman, supra note 213, at 61. 
 308. Health Act, 1937, § 32a(1)–(5) (Quensl). See also Magnusson, supra note 301, at 350.  
 309. Health Act, 1958, § 199(a), (Vict.). See also Magnusson, supra note 301, at 347, 353. 
 310. In 1983, West Australia and the Northern Territory declared AIDS a “notifiable disease,” 
requiring individuals with AIDS to report their illness and public health personnel encountering 
individuals with AIDS to report these individuals’ names to the public health authorities. See, e.g., 
Health Act, 1911 (W. Austl.) and Notifiable Diseases Act, 1981 (N. Terr.). Two years later, other 
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threats that have spun out of control by mandating administrative 
detention. Each of Australia’s seven states, as well as the Northern 
Territory, have passed laws implementing these two goals.311 
What is most striking, however, are the state and territorial rules 
addressing the amelioration of public health threats—and, in particular, the 
guidelines surrounding mandatory administrative detention. While state 
and territorial rules allow the mandatory detention of individuals infected 
with a notifiable disease, detention procedures are subject to an array of 
checks, balances, and restrictions to ensure that the detention only 
advances public health goals.312 Generally, if there are alternatives to 
detention, those alternatives must be pursued.313 According to prevalent 
state and territorial law, therefore, it is practically impossible to impose 
detention on individuals with infectious diseases if it can be demonstrated 
that they do not pose a risk of infecting others or can be monitored in ways 
that preclude mandatory administrative detention. This is critical for 
illegal entrants because detention based on one’s HIV/AIDS status would 
be subject to similar heightened scrutiny by the courts.314 
Several themes are common to the public health detention regulations 
in Australian states and territories, namely: (a) the requirement of explicit 
public health goals; (b) the use of detention as the primary means of 
achieving these goals; and (c) the creation of processes subjecting the 
detention to review and imposing explicit time limits. In New South 
Wales, for example, detention is typically authorized via a “public health 
order,”315 issued by the state executive when an individual is seen as 
“endangering, or [i]s likely to endanger, the health of the public” due to 
symptoms of AIDS and HIV-infection were brought under the ambit of what was notifiable, including: 
“AIDS-related complexes, lymphadenapathy syndrome, and HTLV III infection” in West Australia; in 
1988, “HIV infection groups I-IV” was added in the Northern Territory; and “human 
immunodeficiency virus infection” was later added in Queensland. See Health Act, 1937, § 32 
(Queensl.) (published in the Government Gazette on June 4, 1988).  
 311. The eight pieces of legislation are: Health Act, 1911 (W. Austl.); Health Act, 1937 
(Queensl.); Health Act, 1958 (Vict.); Notifiable Diseases Act, 1981 (N. Terr.); Public and 
Environmental Health Act, 1987 (S. Austl.); Public Health Act, 1991 (N.S.W.); Public Health Act, 
1997 (Tas.); and Public Health Act, 1997 (ACT Austl. Cop. Terr.). For an analysis of the ways in 
which historical health and quarantine legislation was used to detain “undesirables,” see Raymond 
Evans, The Hidden Colonists: Deviance and Social Control in Colonial Queensland, in SOCIAL 
POLICY IN AUSTRALIA: SOME PERSPECTIVES 1901–1975, 74, 90–91 (Jill Roe ed., 1976). 
 312. See, e.g., Public Health Act, 1991, § 23(1)(a) (N.S.W.). 
 313. See, e.g., id. § 25. 
 314. Toonen v. Australia, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., 448th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/c/50/D/488/1992 (1994). The term heightened scrutiny is used to mirror the level of scrutiny 
employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Fourteenth Amendment cases. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1989). 
 315. Public Health Act, 1991, § 23(1)(a) (N.S.W.).  
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their medical condition.316 The order must fully detail the circumstances 
that “purport to justify the making of the order,” the public health goals 
served by detention, and the processes that will be followed in reviewing 
the detention.317 In New South Wales, detention may legitimately advance 
not only treatment, but limitations on conduct.318 Most notably, detention 
“at a specific place” is legitimate solely when an individual has a 
“category 5 medical condition.”319 To date, only HIV and AIDS have been 
declared “category 5” conditions.320 
While all individuals subject to detention have the right to contest their 
detention before a public tribunal composed of public health officials and 
experts, a special tribunal is mandated for those with “category 5” 
conditions.321 This tribunal must inquire into the circumstances underlying 
the order to confirm its validity,322 vary the order if necessary,323 and 
review any requests to continue orders324 for a maximum of six months.325 
Individuals with HIV/AIDS who fail to fulfill the requirements of an order 
can be found guilty of a penal offense, though they are likely to be subject 
to administrative detention imposed by the order, rather than penal 
detention under article III of the constitution. As of 1991, only one 
individual had been detained under the New South Wales legislation.326 
Other states’ provisions mirror those in New South Wales. In several 
cases, they illustrate administrative detention on public health grounds that 
is more aptly viewed as a restriction on one’s liberty rather than 
confinement in “prison.” This largely stems from the fact that these 
provisions allow individuals to spend their detention at home. In West 
Australia, for example, the Executive Director of Public Health may 
exercise “special powers”327 to prevent the “spread of . . . . infectious 
disease,”328 including “forbidding persons to leave . . . . the place in which 
they are isolated or quarantined until they have been medically examined 
 316. Id. In essence, this provision requires that individuals are seen to be endangering others. This 
may seem like a high bar, but it is understandable given that detention is viewed as something only 
employed in the most serious cases. 
 317. Id. § 23(2)(b). 
 318. Id. § 23 (3) (a)–(f). 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. § 25(1)–(3). 
 321. Id. § 25. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. § 25(1)–(3). 
 324. Id. § 26. 
 325. Id. § 25(4)(a). 
 326. See JOHN GODWIN ET AL., AUSTRALIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL GUIDE 3 n.3 (1991). 
 327. Health Act, 1911, § 251 (W. Austl.). 
 328. Id. 
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and found to be free from . . . . disease.”329 The law explicitly notes that 
individuals should be sent to “hospitals” only if they are “without proper 
accommodation” or are living in houses “where the person cannot be 
effectively isolated so as to prevent the risk” of their infection spreading 
“to other persons in the house.”330 Isolation in one’s home is, therefore, the 
preferred approach so long as it is possible with no demonstrable public 
health risk. 
The respective public health laws of Queensland and New South Wales 
also express a preference for treating individuals in their homes. The 
Queensland Health Act of 1937 permits detention of an individual who has 
a notifiable disease and refuses testing, examination, or treatment.331 In 
this case, the detention is for treatment purposes and, while not subject to 
explicit time limits,332 is subject to judicial review to confirm that the 
isolation is “proper.”333 Notably, treatment can occur anywhere so long as 
the treatment takes place and a caregiver oversees it. The statutes in New 
South Wales similarly note that a person can be given directions to stay 
home to deal with health issues,334 albeit under the direction of a Health 
Commission staff member.335 This staff member may be charged with 
ensuring that the detainee is available for requisite medical 
examinations,336 refrains from certain types of work,337 and follows any 
other guidelines to “prevent the spread of infection.”338 
Finally, most states and territories impose time limits on any public 
health administrative detention and subject such detention to review 
procedures. The situation in Victoria is demonstrative. Victoria’s Health 
Act of 1958 grants the Secretary of the Department of Human Services 
broad powers to issue an order requiring an individual to undergo testing 
for an infectious disease, followed by mandatory counseling and 
administrative detention.339 He may only exercise these powers, however, 
if he believes that a person (a) is infected with or has been exposed to an 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. § 263(1)–(2). 
 331. Health Act, 1937, § 36 (Queensl.). 
 332. See id. § 37(1) (noting that “any such order may be limited to some specific time, but with 
full power to any stipendiary magistrate to enlarge such time as often as may appear to the magistrate 
to be necessary”). 
 333. Id. § 36(4). 
 334. Public Health Act, 1991, § 33 (N.S.W.). 
 335. Id. § 33(2)(b). 
 336. Id. § 33(2)(c). 
 337. Id. § 33(2)(d). 
 338. Id. § 33(2)(e). 
 339. See Health Act, 1958 (Vict.). See also Magnusson, supra note 301, at 345. 
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infectious disease and (b) is likely to transmit that disease.340 Time limits 
are subsequently imposed on the Secretary’s power as well: the Secretary 
has seventy-two hours to administer medical tests,341 and mandatory 
isolation is subject to review at least every twenty-eight days.342  
Furthermore, the Victoria Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review all 
public health orders. Any order appealed to the court “must [be] hear[d] 
and determine[d] . . . . urgently.”343 A separate section of the statute lists 
the Secretary’s emergency powers,344 which include the authority to issue 
a proclamation preventing persons of a “specified class” from entering or 
leaving “specified areas” and subjecting them to mandatory administrative 
detention in the “proclaimed area.”345 The statute again imposes explicit 
time limits of two weeks on the detention and any renewal period.346 The 
state parliament has sole authority to review and confirm such emergency 
proclamations, and the act requires parliament to meet “as soon as 
possible” if anyone submits a petition objecting to the proclamation.347 
Similar time limits are found in public health mandates in Tasmania 
and orders in New South Wales. The Tasmanian Public Health Act of 
1997348 limits administrative detention to forty-eight hours for medical 
examinations349 and to six months for ensuring a disease is controlled 
effectively.350 New South Wales also limits the time period for medical 
exams to forty-eight hours and administrative detention to seventy-two 
hours, unless approved by a magistrate.351 New South Wales further 
requires a medical practitioner to examine detainees at intervals not 
exceeding four weeks,352 and detainee refusal will most likely result in 
continued detention.  
 340. Health Act, 1958, § 121(1)(a)–(c) (Vict.). 
 341. Id. § 121(5). 
 342. Id. § 121(8). 
 343. Id. § 122(5). The court is further required to consider four key elements in any appeal: (a) the 
method by which the disease in the public health order is transmitted; (b) the seriousness of the risk of 
other people being infected; (c) the past behaviour and likely conduct of the person to whom the order 
relates; and (d) the extent of the restrictions imposed on the person to whom the order relates. This 
lattermost provision suggests that individuals be prevented from staying at home, as in West Australia. 
See supra note 330 and accompanying text. 
 344. Health Act, 1958, §§ 123–125 (Vict.). 
 345. Id. § 124(1)(a)–(b). 
 346. Id. §§ 123(2)(b)(c). 
 347. Id. § 123(4)(a)–(b)(ii). 
 348. Public Health Act, 1997 (Tas.). 
 349. Id. § 41. 
 350. Id. § 44(2). The Supreme Court of Tasmania can extend mandatory detention periods over 
six months, as well as hear all magistrate decisions on appeal. Id. §§ 44(3), 47. 
 351. Id. § 32(5). 
 352. Id. § 32(7)(a). 
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In summary, the laws of various Australian states suggest that any 
attempts by DIMIA to detain illegal arrivals with HIV/AIDS on the basis 
of their HIV/AIDS status would require significant justification. The 
various statutes, taken together, suggest DIMIA would need to prove: (a) 
why an individual could not stay with their family in Australia or be 
released into homes under supervision, and (b) how their detention 
significantly advances the treatment of their illness and ensures they 
would not pose a risk to the Australian community. DIMIA then would 
also need to ensure that detention would be subject to thorough review 
procedures and time limits. Although due process provisions like that of 
the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution do not protect illegal arrivals 
in Australia, Australian courts do have authority to review habeas corpus 
petitions for all individuals regardless of whether they are citizens.353 
Australian courts, therefore, have a role in ensuring the preservation of 
fundamental rights. This protection impliedly extends to individuals 
subject to prolonged administrative detention because of their HIV/AIDS 
status. 
b. Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
Anti-discrimination laws in the states and territories operate in tandem 
with public health laws and provide a second argument against the 
legitimacy of subjecting illegal arrivals with HIV/AIDS to prolonged 
administrative detention. Because of the greater incidence of HIV/AIDS in 
certain ethnic, racial and gender groups, HIV/AIDS status often overlaps 
issues of race and sex. To prevent detention procedures from becoming 
arbitrary, it is important to limit detention to a specific purpose, such as 
protecting public health.354 State anti-discrimination laws underscore the 
burden that should be placed on an executive attempting to subject illegal 
arrivals to continued detention.355 
State anti-discrimination statutes address an extraordinary breadth of 
issues.356 All states except Tasmania protect individuals with HIV/AIDS. 
The New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act of 1977 explicitly outlaws 
 353. AUSTRL. CONST. ch. III, § 75. 
 354. See Toonen v. Australia, supra note 314. 
 355. See infra note 366 and accompanying text. 
 356. The eight pieces of legislation examined are: Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977 (N.S.W.); Equal 
Opportunity Act, 1984 (S. Austl.); Equal Opportunity Act, 1984 (W. Austl.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 
1991 (Queensl.); Discrimination Act, 1991 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Sex Discrimination Act, 1994 (Tas.); 
Equal Opportunity Act, 1995 (Vict.); Gender Reassignment Act, 2000 (W. Austl.); and the Anti-
Discrimination Act, 2004 (N. Terr.). 
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discrimination based on “HIV/AIDS status/vilification.”357 Other state 
statutes provide similar protection by prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of one’s lawful sexual activity,358 irrelevant medical and criminal 
records,359 and impairment.360  
Overall, the statutes consistently address discrimination directed at 
individuals who are identified with stipulated attributes, and three states 
have expanded this protection to include individuals who are “associated” 
with an individual with a stipulated attribute.361 Furthermore, two states 
explicitly note that judicial remedies are available to individuals who are 
believed to have a stipulated attribute, independent of whether they 
actually have the attribute.362 Also, it should be noted that HIV and AIDS 
claims have been brought under disability discrimination legislation.363 
This broad array of regulations suggests that any attempt by DIMIA to 
subject individuals with HIV/AIDS to continued administrative detention 
would require vigorous justification. These regulations also imply that the 
health concerns of all detainees must be equally addressed to avoid the 
risk of discrimination. If there were a correlation between this treatment 
and race, sex, or sexual orientation, the government would need to 
demonstrate that these factors were not being used to justify giving these 
minorities additional assistance. Given the difficulty of proving the 
absence of reverse discrimination, DIMIA would do well to avoid this 
minefield. 
2. Health Concerns and Non-Discrimination Guidelines in 
Commonwealth & International Law 
In addition to the state regulations mentioned, Australia’s Parliament 
has enacted public health and anti-discrimination legislation. Especially 
when considered in conjunction with international law, these federal, 
 357. Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977, §§ 49ZXA-49ZXC (N.S.W.). 
 358. Equal Opportunity Act, 1995, § 6 (Vict.). 
 359. Anti-Discrimination Act, 2004, § 19 (N. Terr.). 
 360. Id. § 4 (N. Terr.). 
 361. See Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991, § 7 (Queensl.); Discrimination Act, 1991, § 7 (Austl. 
Cap. Terr.); Equal Opportunity Act, 1995, § 6 (Vict.). 
 362. See Anti-Discrimination Act, 2004, § 19 (N. Terr.); Equal Opportunity Act, 1984, § 4 (W. 
Austl.). 
 363. See Georgeana K. Roussos, Protections Against HIV-Based Employment Discrimination in 
the United States and Australia, 13 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 609, 660 n.323 (1990) (citing J. 
Tillett, AIDS, Discrimination, and the Law, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIDS, LIVING WITH AIDS: 
TOWARD THE YEAR 2000, 705 (1988)). 
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health-related laws also suggest that DIMIA cannot prolong the detention 
of individuals with HIV/AIDS.364 
Australian Commonwealth legislation mirrors state legislation in many 
ways, though it leaves many public health issues unaddressed. The 
Commonwealth explicitly turned over government management of public 
health issues to the states with one notable exception—international 
quarantine under the Commonwealth’s Quarantine Act of 1908.365 In 
essence, the Quarantine Act of 1908 has only three sets of provisions that 
DIMIA could use to justify the continued administrative detention of 
unauthorized entrants with HIV/AIDS,366 with the first justification turning 
on the definition of “quarantinable disease.” The introduction to the 
Quarantine Act states that, “quarantinable disease” means small-pox, 
plague, cholera, yellow fever, typhus fever, leprosy, or “any disease 
declared by the Governor-General, by proclamation, to be a quarantinable 
disease.”367 This formulation of the definition of “quarantinable disease” 
grants discretion to the Governor-General to add diseases to the list. This 
obviously makes the position of the Governor-General critical to the issue 
of detention based on HIV/AIDS status. 
The executive authority conferred by Parliament on the Governor-
General parallels that of the Minister of Immigration on matters of 
executive discretion for public health issues. As the recognized arm of 
Queen Elizabeth II, the Australian Head of State,368 there is considerable 
weight given to the Governor-General’s authority. Indeed, giving the 
Governor-General the discretion and sole authority to declare a disease 
quarantinable, reflects Parliament’s desire to accord significant weight to 
such a declaration. Notwithstanding the fact that the Governor-General’s 
role has become increasingly symbolic as the Queen’s direct influence on 
the workings of the Australian Commonwealth has waned, the fact 
 364. In recent years, health has become a central focus of the human rights field in Australia. The 
ways in which the government manages health concerns significantly affect other areas of the law. See 
Caroline J. O’Neill, Health is a Human Right: Why the U.S. Immigration Law Response to Gender-
Based Asylum Claims Requires More Attention to International Human Rights Norms, 17 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 241 (2000); Michelle Forrest, Using the Power of the World Health 
Organization: The International Health Regulations and the Future of International Health Law, 33 
COLUM. J.L. & J. PROBS. 153 (2000). 
 365. See Quarantine Act, 1906, § 5-18 (Austl.).  
 366. Notably, the Minister of Health, like the Minister of Immigration, may detain illegal arrivals. 
However, the Minister of Health’s power is purely discretionary, while the Minister of Immigration 
must comply with the new set of provisions in the Migration Act. See infra note 371 and 
accompanying text. 
 367. Quarantine Act, 1908, § 5 (Austl.). 
 368. Australia is not a republic, and the Queen is Head of State. CIA World Factbook, Australia, 
at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/as.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2005). 
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remains that the Governor-General continues to be powerful, as he retains 
such powers as the ability to dissolve Parliament.369  
Were HIV/AIDS-status to be declared a “quarantinable disease,” the 
Quarantine Act would vest the Minister of Health with authority to 
determine how to manage the disease.370 Specifically, the act gives the 
minister discretion when he believes an emergency has arisen to “take 
such quarantine measures, or measures incidental to quarantine, and give 
such directions as he or she thinks necessary or desirable for the diagnosis, 
prevention or control of, the introduction, establishment or spread, for the 
eradication, or for the treatment of any disease or pest”.371 The act also 
vests the minister with discretion to quarantine: persons “infected with a 
quarantinable disease or quarantinable pest;” persons who have been “in 
contact with . . . . infection from any person subject to quarantine;” and, 
most notably, “every person who enters Australia or the Cocos Islands 
unlawfully.”372 
Despite the authorization in section 18(1)(b) to detain those who enter 
Australia unlawfully, it ultimately seems logical that HIV/AIDS would 
have to be declared a quarantinable disease by the Governor-General to 
justify the continued detention of illegal arrivals with HIV/AIDS due to 
both the length of time and change in grounds on which these individuals 
were initially detained. Typically, the Minister of Immigration will have 
initiated the detention at the time when the infected individuals arrived 
without visas; in most cases, the Minister of Health will not have also 
simultaneously detained them under a quarantine. As a result, if the 
question is analyzed under the authority of the quarantine regulations, it 
does not matter whether individuals could be released under immigration 
law; they would simply remain detained under the quarantine regulations. 
If, however, DIMIA seeks to justify the continued detention of 
 369. AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, § 5 “Sessions of Parliament: Prorogation and Dissolution” (noting that 
the “Governor-General . . . . may dissolve the House of Representatives”).  
 370. Quarantine Act, 1908, § 12A(1) (Austl.). 
 371. Id. (emphasis added). 
 372. Id. §§ 18(1)(b)–(c),(e). This explicit authorization to quarantine anyone who has arrived 
unlawfully—independent of whether the individual has a quarantinable disease—suggests that the 
question of whether HIV/AIDS is a quarantinable condition, at least for unlawful immigrants, is moot. 
In this case, there would be no need for DIMIA to force the Minister of Health to quarantine 
individuals with HIV/AIDS by having HIV/AIDS declared a quarantinable condition. Notably, the 
statute allows the Minister of Health to issue a proclamation directing detention of all illegal arrivals, 
even if no diseases are declared quarantinable. Id. § 18(1). Doing so, however, would be unwise. 
Given DIMIA’s desire to limit illegal immigration, DIMIA should declare a disease quarantinable to 
compel such a proclamation from the Minister of Health. 
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unauthorized arrivals under the public health laws, then whether the 
detainees’ disease is now quarantinable is significant.373 
Quarantining individuals with HIV/AIDS also raises issues of equal 
treatment. For example, while the Commonwealth has never outlawed 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, it has, on the other hand, 
enacted legislation that affects the quarantine of individuals with 
HIV/AIDS.374 These Commonwealth laws include the Racial 
Discrimination Act of 1975,375 the Sex Discrimination Act of 1984,376 and, 
most notably, the Disability Discrimination Act of 1992.377 The Disability 
Discrimination Act of 1992 explicitly defines “disability” as including 
“the presence in the body of organisms causing . . . . or capable of causing 
disease or illness,”378 employing language paralleling that of several state 
statutes.379 While these laws focus predominantly on issues of employment 
discrimination,380 they are supplemented by the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission Act of 1986 (Human Rights Act).381 The Human 
Rights Act not only led to the formation of the HREOC, but also fueled 
HREOC’s role in ensuring consistent application of Commonwealth laws 
to individuals in areas such as gun control, racial hatred on the internet, 
substance abuse on aboriginal lands, and, most notably for these purposes, 
the mandatory immigration detention of children.382 HREOC monitoring 
and enforcement of key statutes has a direct bearing on the scope of those 
 373. Hence, if DIMIA justifies the continued detention of individuals with HIV/AIDS based on its 
status as a quarantinable disease, future unauthorized arrivals with HIV/AIDS would similarly be 
subject to detention under the Migration Act and the Quarantine Act. This would remove such 
detention from DIMIA’s jurisdiction. 
 The initial justification for continued administrative detention of illegal arrivals with HIV/AIDS 
no longer allows DIMIA to continue this administrative detention. Most illegal arrivals in 
administrative detention who have had visas denied await deportation and the issue whether these 
individuals have HIV/AIDS is irrelevant to their continued detention. 
 374. It is worth reiterating that the stipulations serve more as advice than as a mandate because the 
individuals being detained are not Australian citizens and, as such, are not afforded the privileges of 
Commonwealth legislation. 
 375. Racial Discrimination Act, 1975 (Austl.). 
 376. Disability Discrimination Act, 1992 (Austl.). The act bears on those with HIV/AIDS given 
the correlation between sexual orientation and HIV/AIDS. See supra note 266. 
 377. Sex Discrimination Act, 1984, 20 F.C.R. 217, Div. 3 §§ 28A–28B (Austl.) 
 378. Disability Discrimination Act, 1992, § 4(1) (Austl.). 
 379. See, e.g., Equal Opportunity Act, 1995, § 4 (Vict.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991, § 4 
(Queensl.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991, § 4 (Austl. Cap. Terr.). 
 380. Australia has some of the most stringent protections in the world in this regard. See Roussos, 
supra note 363. 
 381. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986 (Austl.) [hereinafter Human 
Rights Act]. 
 382. For a discussion of the wide array of areas investigated by HREOC, see the website of 
HREOC, at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2004). 
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statutes, at least in their application. These HREOC investigations can be a 
means of discerning if Parliament intended that anti-discrimination 
legislation be applied to individuals in circumstances beyond those 
specifically identified in the original acts—here on behalf of detained 
illegal arrivals—so long as the application is “consistent” with the spirit of 
the acts and the formation of HREOC.  
While the Australian Parliament does not consider itself bound by the 
literal terms383 of the international treaties it has signed,384 there is no 
question regarding the level of commitment required of Australia under 
the general principles of these international treaties.385 Australia’s 
adherence to the principles in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights,386 the ICCPR,387 the U.N. Declaration on the 
Rights of Disabled Persons,388 and the Resolution of the Forty-First World 
Health Assembly389 illustrates its commitment to the equal treatment of 
people with HIV/AIDS. The foci of these agreements complement and 
underscore the rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Universal Declaration), including the right of individuals to “seek and to 
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”390  
International precedent on detention issues is also readily available. 
The European Court of Human Rights, for example, has stated that 
deprivation of liberty is permitted “only when such deprivation is effected 
for the purpose of bringing the person arrested or detained before the 
competent judicial authority.”391 For a state to justify detention measures 
for individuals with HIV/AIDS, the state would also need to establish that 
 383. Roussos, supra note 363, at 650 n.255, citing Commonwealth v. Tasmania (1983) 46 A.L.R. 
625, 693–94 (holding that Australia is allowed “latitude when interpreting international instruments”). 
 384. Roussos, supra note 363, at 650 n.256, citing P. McCarry, Landmines Among the Landmarks: 
Constitutional Aspects of Anti-Discrimination Laws, 63 AUSTL. L. J. 327, 328 (1989). 
 385. See Press Release, Philip Ruddock MP, New Australian Framework for Human Rights (Dec. 
23, 2004), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Page/Media_ 
Releases (last visited Mar. 21, 2005). 
 386. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 
3. 
 387. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 388. Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, § 1, G.A. Res. 3447(xxx), 30 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 34) at 88, U.N. Doc. A/12034 (1975). While this declaration does not mention AIDS, the 
preamble’s reference to the “physically and mentally disadvantaged” suggests those with HIV/AIDS 
would be covered. Id. pmbl. 
 389. Avoidance of Discrimination in Relation to HIV-Infected People and People With AIDS, 
Res. WHA 41.24, World Health Assembly (1988), available at http://policy.who.int/cgi-bin/ 
om_isapi.dll?infobase=wha&record={3646}&softpage=Document42 (last visited Mar. 21, 2005). 
 390. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
 391. Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 15, 27 (1961). 
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“both the individual concerned had the infection and that his or her 
detention was necessary for preventing its spread.”392 Furthermore, the 
European Court of Human Rights has held in subsequent cases that 
detention for an indeterminant period is lawful only if detainees are given 
a right to “regular and periodic judicial reviews in order to ascertain 
whether the reasons for his or her detention continue to be . . . . lawful.”393 
There are also policy benefits to sparing individuals with HIV/AIDS 
from continued detention. First and foremost, as the World Health 
Organization (WHO) has stated explicitly, the best strategy for preventing 
the spread of HIV/AIDS is to ensure that HIV-infected individuals remain 
“integrated within society to the maximum possible extent and be helped 
to assume responsibility for preventing HIV transmission to others.”394 
Allowing illegal arrivals with HIV/AIDS to leave detention would help to 
foster this integration, empowerment, and responsibility, in place of the 
feeling of victimization associated with detention. Second, eliminating 
HIV/AIDS as a justification for continued detention would help to curb the 
excessive discretion exercised by health officials in deciding when to 
release HIV/AIDS patients. This is important because the length of 
incarceration395 must be consistent with the goal of ensuring and 
preserving human rights.396 
There are also important international policy implications to prolonging 
the detention of unauthorized arrivals. Philip Ruddock, the former 
Minister of Immigration, Multicultural, and Aboriginal Affairs and 
Australia’s current Attorney General, explained that cooperation between 
Australia and southeast-Asian nations has helped stem the tide of illegal 
 392. PAUL SIEGHART, AIDS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A UK PERSPECTIVE, 44 (1989). 
 393. Id. at 46. See also Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 387 (1979); X v. United 
Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 188 (1981); Van Droogenbroek v. Belgium, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 443 (1982); 
Weeks v. United Kingdom, Judgment of the Court (1987) 10 Eur. Ct. H.R. 293, cited in SIEGHART, 
supra note 391, at 46 nn.80–81. 
 394. SIEGHART, supra note 391, at 45 n.77, citing WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, SOCIAL 
ASPECTS OF AIDS PREVENTION AND CONTROL PROGRAMMES (1987). 
 395. See ADRIAN P. JOEL, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO OBTAINING PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN 
AUSTRALIA 51 (1987). 
 396.  Such human rights can be derogated in times of public emergency or risk of “epidemic 
disease;” the derogation, however, is “only acceptable to the extent that the measures are not 
inconsistent with the state’s other obligations under international law.” INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION 
OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, AIDS, HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN 
EXPLANATORY MANUAL 19 (1995). Consistency is particularly important in cases of quarantine and 
detention for “stigmatized” and “less powerful” social groups that have thus far been managed 
inconsistently. Examples of these stigmatized groups include homosexual men, lesbians, and 
immigrants. ALAN PETERSEN & DEBORAH LUFTON, THE NEW PUBLIC HEALTH: HEALTH AND SELF IN 
THE AGE OF RISK 72 (1996).  
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immigrants to Australia.397 Decreasing the number of illegal arrivals has in 
turn helped to ensure that “Australia’s asylum program was not abused” 
and could help the country to maintain its role as a “generous settler of 
refugees.”398 Ruddock believed it would be detrimental to Australia to use 
HIV/AIDS as a basis for explicitly refusing people asylum, expelling 
individuals who are infected, or subjecting these individuals to further 
administrative detention.399 Transcending the limited goal of relieving the 
social welfare burden caused by immigrants400 is essential if Australia is to 
become a leading industrialized nation in terms of its protection of 
individual human rights. 
3. Pragmatism & Health Concerns in Australian Society 
Statutory minutia and legal maneuverings aside, Australia is one of the 
world’s most progressive countries in its management of the spread of 
HIV/AIDS.401 In this context, it is inconsistent with Australia’s otherwise 
progressive outlook for DIMIA to use individuals’ HIV/AIDS status in 
subjecting them to continued detention, especially when the populace 
would largely oppose these moves. Indeed, Australia’s progressive 
management of HIV/AIDS, along with the progressive opinions of its 
citizenry, suggest that DIMIA should not attempt to prolong the detention 
of illegal arrivals with HIV/AIDS. 
One first turns to Australia’s historically progressive approach to 
HIV/AIDS management. Early in the AIDS epidemic, Australia 
acknowledged that safe sex was the key to arresting the spread of the 
disease.402 The Australian government adopted explicit and aggressive 
AIDS education campaigns designed to “reduc[e] the incidence and 
impact of HIV/AIDS.”403 Indeed, the government considered legal 
initiatives to be far less effective than educational initiatives in managing 
 397. Southeast Asian Cooperation Cuts Immigrant Flow: Australia, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 
Oct. 8, 2002. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. 
 400. See Robert Birrell, Problems of Immigration Control in Liberal Democracies, in NATIONS OF 
IMMIGRANTS 24 (Gary P. Freeman & James Jupp eds., 1992). 
 401. Paul Sendziuk, Learning to Trust: Australian Responses to AIDS, GAY & LESBIAN REV., 
Mar. 1, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 12672744. 
 402. John Ballard, The Constitution of AIDS in Australia: Taking ‘Government at a Distance’ 
Seriously, in GOVERNING AUSTRALIA: STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY RATIONALITIES OF GOVERNMENT 
125 (Mitchell Dean & Barry Hindess eds., 1998). 
 403. DON NUTBEAM ET AL., GOALS AND TARGETS FOR AUSTRALIA’S HEALTH IN THE YEAR 2000 
AND BEYOND: REPORT PREPARED FOR THE COMMONWEALTH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HOUSING & 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 66 (1993). 
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AIDS,404 and ideas of quarantine and compulsory detention were raised 
and discarded.405 Among its many initiatives, the government funded a 
homosexual community building,406 advocacy for safe sex practices 
among sex workers, and assistance for drug users.407 Although churches 
and right-wing politicians protested, advocates for these progressive 
programs prevailed.408 The Queensland Intravenous AIDS Association 
(QuIVAA)409 and the West Australia Intravenous Equity Association 
(WAIVE) are successful progeny of these efforts, as were dozens of other 
state-run and community-managed groups.410  
Social attitudes both informed and altered these policies. When 
compared to the United States, several factors facilitated Australia’s 
relative ease in managing HIV/AIDS. In Australia, issues regarding sex 
were addressed more easily because the “agenda of the Moral Right” 
never took hold.411 Australian AIDS organizations did not minimize the 
connection between AIDS and homosexual men, as was done in the 
United States.412 They also emphasized “inventive and sex positive” 
educational techniques.413 As a result of these approaches, gay men in 
Australia are more apt to have AIDS tests than even their counterparts in 
New Zealand, a nation long-considered to be a bastion of openness and 
progressiveness.414  
Following the dismantling of the White Australia Policy in 1973,415 
Australia also sought to ensure the fair and equal treatment of all non-
 404. Roussos, supra note 363, at 643. 
 405. Roussos, supra note 363, at 645. 
 406. See G. W. Dowsett, The Sociological Context, in AIDS IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 213, at 92 
n.19, citing S. Kippax et al., Gay Men’s Knowledge of HIV Transmission and ‘Safe’ Sex: A Question 
of Accuracy, 25 AUSTL. J. SOC. ISSUES 199–219 (1990). 
 407. Intravenous drug users were included in a list of high risk groups and this continues to be 
true, as demonstrated by recent plans to create supervised injection facilities in New South Wales. See 
Ian Malkin, Establishing Supervised Injecting Facilities: A Responsible Way to Help Minimize Harm, 
25 MELB. U. L. REV. 680 (2001). 
 408. See Altman, supra note 213, at 64. 
 409. See Website of the Queensland Intravenous Association, at http://www.quivaa.org.au (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2005) (advising people to “lust for life; shoot for safety”). 
 410. For a full list of organizations, see Website of Medical Online—Australia AIDS Resources, 
at http://www.medicalonline.com.au/medical/professional/aids/resources.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 
2005). 
 411. Id. at 67. 
 412. Id. at 68 n.30. 
 413. Altman, supra note 213, at 69 n.31. 
 414. See B.R.S. ROSSER, MALE HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE EFFECTS OF AIDS 
EDUCATION: A STUDY OF BEHAVIOR AND SAFER SEX IN NEW ZEALAND AND SOUTH AUSTRALIA 65 
(1991). 
 415. CROCK, supra note 35, at 33. 
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citizen entrants.416 Organizations such as the Indo-Chinese Australian 
Women’s Association (ICHAWA) and the Child Adolescent and Family 
Health Service (CAFHS) began employing “bicultural educators” early in 
the AIDS epidemic to ensure that the “major ethnic communities” were 
able to “provide more effective and relevant health services for migrants 
and refugees.”417 These initiatives operated within growing philosophical 
links between public health, refugees, and human rights policies418 which 
arose largely out of the increasing advocacy of the HREOC of the 
principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,419 ICCPR,420 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights,421 and Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.422 Australian 
participation in many of these instruments indicates for observers in 
general—and for refugees in particular—that Australians appear especially 
committed to upholding the key principles of article 9 of the ICCPR.423 
Activism has affected government policy, as well. ACT UP arrived in 
Australia to press for change in late 1989,424 and the Australian National 
Council on AIDS (ANCA) obtained its first openly HIV-Positive member, 
the former President of the Australian Federation of AIDS Organizations, 
in 1991.425 The Australian government subsequently funded massive 
studies to address AIDS issues, such as the most recent Sydney Men and 
Sexual Health (SMASH) study. It lasted from 1993–1998 and is one of the 
largest and most comprehensive longitudinal studies of gay and 
homosexually active men ever conducted.426 Australia was also an early 
donor to the Global Programme on AIDS (GPA), a subdivision of 
 416. CROCK & SAUL, supra note 50, at 8. 
 417. Neil Wigg, Promoting Health with Children, Adolescents, and Their Families, in HEALTH 
FOR ALL: THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 403 (Fran Baum ed., 1995). 
 418. See Pyne, supra note 272, at 1. 
 419. See generally Universal Declaration, supra note 390. 
 420. See generally ICCPR, supra note 187, art. 9(1). 
 421. See generally African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 
1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force October 21, 1986. 
 422. See generally Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 107th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 
(1979). 
 423. ICCPR, supra note 187, art. 9, cls. 1, 4. 
 424. Altman, supra note 213, at 60. ACT UP is a direct action group that seeks to compel 
governments to expedite testing of new drugs and treatments. See Website of the AIDS Action 
Council, Assessment of Significance, at http://www.aidsaction.org.au/content/publications/cehpu/ 
assessment_of_significance.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2005). 
 425. See Website of the Australian Federation of AIDS Organisations, at http://www.afao.org.au/ 
index.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2005); Altman, supra note 213, at 65. 
 426. See Juliet Richters et al., Condom Use and ‘Withdrawal’: Exploring Gay Men’s Practice of 
Anal Intercourse, 11 INT. J. STD AIDS 96, 98 (2000). 
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UNAIDS,427 and it appointed Justice Michael Kirby, a current member of 
the Australian High Court and the highest-ranking openly gay judge in the 
world, to the Global Commission on AIDS soon after the Commission’s 
founding.428 Most recently, Australia hosted the Sixth International 
Conference on AIDS in the Asia Pacific (ICAAP) on October 5–10, 2001 
in Melbourne.429 
Discrimination—against both homosexual individuals and migrants 
alike—has been a concern of the federal government, which has sought to 
ensure state legislative regimes protect these groups.430 Furthermore, not 
withstanding DIMIA’s response to illegal arrivals, the Australian 
Department of Health and Aging maintains funding for an array of 
programs and committees that combat AIDS, such as the Australian 
National Council on AIDS, Hepatitis C, and Related Diseases 
(ANCAHRD, formerly ANCA).431 The legacy of former Prime Minister 
Gough Whitlam’s “community health programmes,”432 these programs 
formed his vision of making Australia one of the “most proactive of . . . . 
developed countries in formulating legislative policies” to public health 
issues like HIV/AIDS.433 
Australia must ensure it maintains its principles by ensuring that 
DIMIA’s administrative detention of illegal arrivals with HIV/AIDS is 
rational and in accord with the country’s progressive history with regard to 
HIV/AIDS policy.434 Certainly, the danger to Australia is great. In light of 
the unprecedented number of non-immigrant visitors in Australia,435 the 
escalation of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the Asia-Pacific region poses a 
 427. See Website of UNAIDS, at http://www.unaids.org (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
 428. See Website of the High Court of Australia, Current Justices–Michael Kirby, at 
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/kirbyj.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2005). 
 429. Mark Bebbington, International Policy, published on Website of the Australian Federation of 
Aids Organizations, at http://www.afao.org.au/library_docs/annual_reports/ar02_international_and_ 
policy.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2005). 
 430. See generally Marlene C. McGuirl & Robert N. Gee, AIDS: An Overview of the British, 
Australian, and American Responses, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 107 (1985). 
 431. Australian Government Department of Health and Aging, New and Expanded National 
Council on AIDS, Hepatitis C and Related Diseases Announced, at http://www.health.gov.an/internet/ 
wcms/publishing.nsf/content/health-mediarel-yr1999-mw-mw99123.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2005). 
 432. See Altman, supra note 213, at 64 n.22, citing S. Duckett, Structural Interests and Australian 
Health Policy, 18 SOC. SCI. & MED. 959–66 (1984).  
 433. See Francine A, Hochberg, HIV/AIDS and Blood Donation Policies: A Comparative Study of 
Public Health Policies and Individual Rights Norms, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INTL’ L. 231 (2002). 
 434. See RED CROSS, supra note 396, at 54. 
 435. Statistics Section, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 
Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics, Number 21, 1999–00 (2002), available at 
http://www.immi.gov.au/statistics/publications/consolidate_statistics/consol21.pdf (illustrating the 
number of non-immigrants arriving in Australia 1989–2000). 
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real threat to Australia’s public health. Australia has promulgated a 
national strategy to combat AIDS that includes five priority areas, the first 
of which calls for both the creation of an “enabling environment” to 
address HIV/AIDS and the protection of the “human rights of people 
living with AIDS and people at risk of HIV infection.”436 Because national 
strategies have not been adopted for other infectious diseases, such as 
Hepatitis C,437 or for issues affecting aboriginal health,438 the federal 
government appears to view HIV/AIDS as demanding special attention. 
V. PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES TO PROLONGED ADMINISTRATIVE 
DETENTION 
There are practical alternatives to indefinite detention that respect the 
rights of illegal arrivals with HIV/AIDS and comport with international 
law and Australia’s policy goals. The Migration Act provides that all 
unlawful non-citizens are subject to detention until they are either 
removed, deported, or granted a visa.439 Although it explains that the 
object of the Migration Act is to “regulate, in the national interest, the 
coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens,”440 it says nothing 
about the underlying purpose or goals of detention itself.441 Despite its 
unqualified detention requirements, Australia’s parliament amended the 
Migration Act in the mid-1990s to allow the release of certain unlawful 
non-citizens from detention under bridging visas.442 These visas give 
qualified individuals, including the spouses of Australian citizens and 
permanent residents over seventy years old and people with special 
medical needs, temporary lawful status (pending consideration of their 
applications) to remain in Australia.443 The Minister of Immigration, 
furthermore, has discretion to confer a bridging visa to any person in 
detention for more than six months who meets a series of additional 
standards.444 A readily available alternative to indefinite detention thus 
already exists in Australia. By its terms, however, it affects only a “very 
 436. Australian National Council on AIDS, Hepatitis C, and Related Diseases (ANCAHRD), 
2000–2001 Annual Report, at 10, available at http://www.ancahrd.org/pubs/pdfs/reportoo.pdf#search= 
‘ANCAHRD%2020002001%Annual%20Report’ (last visited Feb. 6, 2005). 
 437. Id. at 14. 
 438. Id. at 17–18. 
 439. Migration Act, § 196(1). 
 440. See Migration Act, § 4; see also HREOC, supra note 200, at 15. 
 441. See generally Migration Act, §§ 100–199. 
 442. See Migration Act, § 73. 
 443. See Migration Regulation 2.20(8)(C). 
 444. See Migration Act, § 72(2), (3). 
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limited”445 class of people and fails to accommodate the broader concerns 
of indefinite detention. 
Fortunately, there are other alternatives to indefinite detention that both 
meet the public policy objectives of the current mandatory administrative 
detention policy and assist a wider group of individuals. DIMIA’s current 
detention policy seeks to ensure that: (a) detainees are readily available 
during the processing of any visa applications and available for removal 
from Australia if their applications are unsuccessful; (b) detainees are 
available for the health checks that are required for a visa to be granted; 
and (c) unauthorized arrivals do not enter the Australian community until 
their identity and status has been properly assessed and their visa has been 
granted.446 Because any alternative to an indefinite detention regime must 
involve some sort of conditional release, it is critical to assess the degree 
to which alternative regimes achieve these three DIMIA goals. Overall, the 
first two goals can be attained following the conditional release of 
individuals who have been detained for an extended period of time. Illegal 
arrivals can then easily be released into communities with local guardians 
to keep track of their whereabouts and to inform the authorities in the rare 
event they abscond. The third goal is also achievable if the standards both 
clearly state the conditions for release and do not violate international 
human rights requirements. 
In its Detention Guidelines, the UNHCR notes, that “alternatives to the 
detention of an asylum seeker . . . should be considered . . .. which provide 
State authorities with a degree of control over the whereabouts of asylum 
seekers while allowing asylum seekers basic freedom of movement.”447 
The UNHCR also notes that a range of options exist that can provide 
governments with the security they need in low-risk cases. These options 
include miscellaneous monitoring requirements, provisions for guarantors 
/ surety, release on bail, and openly monitored centers.448 
The Refugee Council of Australia (RCOA), building on the alternative 
systems to mandatory detention employed in Europe, has proposed a 
comprehensive system using a three-stage model to meet Australia’s 
policy goals.449 Under this system, all unlawful non-citizens are subject to 
 445. HREOC, supra note 200, at 20–21.  
 446. Website of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 82 
Immigration Detention: Fact Sheet, at http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/82detention.htm (last visited Feb. 
13, 2005). 
 447. UN Human Rights Commission Report, supra note 275, Guideline 4. 
 448. Id., Guideline 4(i)–(iv). 
 449. Refugee Council of Australia, Alternatives to Detention, at http://www.refugeecouncil. 
org.au/html/current_issues/alternatives1.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2005). 
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closed detention for a maximum of ninety days. However, bridging visas 
may be granted, allowing the release of individuals who meet a series of 
key character and identity “checks.”450 This release can be either in the 
form of open detention or community release.451  
Identity “checks” also comport with the three principal reasons noted in 
the UNHCR Detention Guidelines for initially detaining asylum seekers, 
namely: (a) verifying identity, (b) determining the basis for refugee status 
or an asylum claim, and (c) protecting national security and the public 
order.452 Indeed, while the UNHCR’s Guidelines justify short-term 
detention, failure to meet any of RCOA’s criteria would prevent long-term 
release. Mandatory detention would also apply to anyone breaching the 
terms of their release. The RCOA system relieves the government of 
significant burdens while simultaneously engaging interested community 
members in its operation. 
Other alternative detention models with similar elements provide 
comparable benefits.453 For example, the HREOC outlines a system with 
benefits that include: (a) greater flexibility in moving applicants from one 
detention stage to another as their circumstances change; (b) financial 
savings by significantly reducing the use of costly closed detention; (c) 
enhanced equity by reducing disparities in treatment between individuals 
who are and are not allowed to immigrate; (d) increased Australian 
compliance with international obligations and standards; (e) a more 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id. In open detention, a detainee may freely leave a detention facility, subject to curfew 
restrictions. DIMIA also remains responsible for the accommodation and welfare of detainees. A 
community release system allows a detainee to live in the community under the supervision of family 
members or community organizations. Typically, there are only a few restrictions on community 
release. These include liberating the detainees’ residence to a particular address and requiring him to 
report to authorities at regular intervals. Id. The identity “checks” confirm (a) a detainee’s identity, (b) 
the existence of a valid visa application, (c) that the individual is not a threat to the national security or 
the public order, (d) that there is a demonstrated likelihood that the individual will not abscond, and (e) 
that the detainee has completed health clearances. Id. 
 452. UN Human Rights Commission Report, supra note 275, Guideline 3. 
 453. The alternative detention models include systems advocated by the Conference of Leaders of 
Religious Institutes (CONFERENCE OF LEADERS OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTES (NSW), POLICY PROPOSAL 
FOR ADJUSTMENTS TO AUSTRALIA’S ASYLUM SEEKING PROCESS (Sydney, Australia, Conference of 
Leaders of Religious Institutes, 2001)); Justice for Asylum Seekers Project (JUSTICE FOR ASYLUM 
SEEKERS PROJECT, TRANSITIONAL PROCESSING AND RECEPTION MODEL (Sydney, Australia, Justice 
for Asylum Seekers Project, 2000)); and the Australian Council of Churches (AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL 
OF CHURCHES ET AL., CHARTER OF MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGISLATION RELATING TO THE 
DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS (Sydney, Australia, Australian Council of Churches, 2000)). See 
also Chris Sidoti, Commissioner of the Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, Refugee Policy: Is there a Way out of this Mess?, Address to the Racial Respect Seminar 
(Feb. 21, 2002); INDEPENDENT EDUCATION UNION, REFUGEE AND ASYLUM SEEKER POLICY IN 
AUSTRALIA (Sydney, Australia, 2002). 
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humane regime by providing for mechanisms that can meet individual 
circumstances; and (f) less domestic and international criticism for 
Australia’s immigration detention practices.454  
These alternative systems allow a set of controlled guidelines that can 
be readily introduced, avoid the risk of indefinite detention, and provide 
greater flexibility and justice. While most individuals who meet the key 
prerequisites would have already been released when the maximum time 
limit on detention expires, it ensures that indefinite detention is avoided—
particularly for those with HIV/AIDS. It thus ensures compliance with 
legal and international principles. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Australia’s Department of Immigration has arrived at a crossroads. It 
must ensure the sanctity of Australia’s borders while simultaneously 
respecting the human rights of illegal entrants. DIMIA can best advance 
these two demands by releasing individuals from administrative detention 
when the time to effectuate their removal has expired. While the continued 
detention of individuals based on their HIV/AIDS-positive status may 
perhaps appear benign, it is certainly problematic. DIMIA’s authority to 
address public health matters directly is unclear. Moreover, the use of 
HIV/AIDS status to detain individuals may violate both social mores and 
numerous state and federal guidelines.  
There are alternatives to administrative detention that avoid these 
problems, including proposals by the HREOC and other advocacy groups. 
These alternative detention schemes fulfill the government’s two goals of 
both sending a message that it upholds the rule of law and dissuading 
individuals from attempting to enter Australia illegally to obtain 
immediate permanent residency.  
The rise in the number of rejections of refugee applications for 
permanent residency in Australia raises the question of whether Australia 
still seeks to uphold the principles of justice and fairness.455 Australian 
tolerance for HIV/AIDS has decreased in recent years. In a recent survey, 
 454. HREOC, supra note 200, at 238. 
 455. East Timorese are a case in point, with individuals who have been in Australia over a decade 
being told they can now go “back home” because of the newly elected East Timorese government and 
the country’s recent acceptance into the United Nations. Few would doubt that East Timor is now a 
sovereign nation, but ten years is also a significant enough time for individuals to lay roots in a new 
homeland, which is what many now consider Australia to be. Arguments in favor of a more 
compassionate policy toward East Timorese have been gaining publicity. See Editorial, Compassion 
for East Timorese, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 25, 2002, at 10. 
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more Australians wanted to quarantine HIV/AIDS-infected individuals 
than in the early years of the disease’s epidemic.456 Fears that the epidemic 
is reasserting itself may underlie this change in public opinion. Indeed, 
infection rates have increased as the lifespan of individuals with 
HIV/AIDS and the incidence of unprotected sex have risen. Managing 
HIV/AIDS (and the public health more generally) should begin by 
relieving those fears. A more moderate immigration detention policy by 
DIMIA that does not rely on HIV/AIDS as grounds for continued 
detention, is a sound first step in that process.  
 456. In a public survey in 1990, 46% of Australians were reported to favour quarantining those 
with AIDS, up from 32% in 1987; comparable figures included 26% in the United States and 16% in 
France. L. Crisp, You in the 90s, THE BULLETIN, Sept. 18, 1990, at 50, cited in Altman, supra note 
213, at 70 n.36. 
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